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THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIOLOGf
OF KNOWLEDGE 
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Theoretical advancement in sociology is contingent upon
an understanding of the cognitive framework of these who hope to
convey an explanation of social phenomena. Throughout much of
the history of sociolody, dis&greement as to how one should
approach social theory has existed; the most marked difference
being that between adherents of positivism and Those who,
following Max Veber, attempt to view social reality through the
subjective orientations of the individual or group. Speaking of
th2 complicated and detailed classifications of modern socio-
logical theories, one inveterate critic of sociology says that
"this multifariousness of classifications denotes a rather
chaotic situation, but this is quite natural and not reprehensible
at all."1 However in this thesis, the question of how and why
these diverse approaches exist will be considered as a theoretical
problem in itself.
The sociology of knowledge emerged as the self-consciousness
of this multitude of perspectives in the political turmoil modern
man has experienced with the onset of the Industrial Revolution
1 . .
Pitlrim A. Sorokin, Sociolocical Theories of Today 
(New York: Parper and Ro.;, 1966), p. 9.
2
and the rapid development of science and technology. Furthermore
Gunter Remmling has gone so far to say that the sociology of
knowledge is the theoretical formulation of "rental entropy," or
the loss of ihtellectual certainty accompanying the accumulation
of reservoirs of knowledge.
2 
Moreover, the sociology of knowledge
perspective has Leen used to "debunk" social theory and thought
as ideological expressions of class-based interests. As Louis
Wirth suggested thirty-six years ace, the progress of social
knowledge is impeded if not paralyzed by this politicization of
the intellectual arena.3
However, it is questionable whether the sociology of
knowledge should confine itself to the study of ideology, as has
much of the work done under its auspices. One difficulty is that
the discipline suffers from a lack of clarification of what indeed
it is supposed to cover. In the United States the sociology of
knowledge is often viewed suspiciously as a variant of sp,?culative
European philosophy which lacks empirical quality and at tires
even appears to be self-refuting. In a review of the field Franz
Adler states "there is unfortunately no generally accepted
delimitation of the 'sociology of knowledge'."4 The sociology
2Road to Suspicion, A Study cf %dem Vent?.liV. and The
Sociology of I:nc.41edge flew York: Appleton-Cenzury-Crofts,
p. 5.
3"Preface," in Karl Mannheim, Id,?ology and Utopia (New York:Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936), p. xi.
40The Paroc of the Sociology of Knowlege," in ModFrn
Sociolonical Theory, ed. by Hm:ard Becker and -ivin Boskoif,
-Gew York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 195/, p. 396.
3
of knowledge has been defined so broadly as to hinder its
developent. The purpose of this thesis then is to (1) offer a
more concise definition of the sociology of knowledge; and
(2) apply this definition in its relationship to sociological
theory.
The second chapter of the thesis is intended, after
tentatively defining the scope of the sociology of k7icwledge,
to be a review of the literature perteining to studies in the
field. Chapter II considers the sociology of knowledge in five
approaches which are the author's own designations: the
structural, cultural, phenoTenological, sociology of science,
end contemporary empirical studies. Special emphasis bill be
given to the phenomenological approach, which is currently gaining
a stronger foothold in the United States and is probably the 1,east
understood approach. The work of Max Scheler, Werner Stark,
Alfred Schutz, and Peter Berger is included in this section.
Under the structural classification are placed Emile Durkheim
and Karl Mannheim. Karl :."arx is also included in the structuralist
approach, although interpretation of his thought will actually
place him in a more independent category. The cultural approach
is most concerned with the work of Pitirim A. Sorokin and Talcott
Parsons. The sociology of science is taken to include the
scciology of sociology, with special attention given to Robert
Friedrichs and Alvin Gouldner. Chapter II then traces the
theoretical, rather than the historical, developrent of the
sociology of kno.,ledge.
Utilizing the insights gained from the preceding chapter,
Chapter III delimits and narrows the theoretical relevance and
perspective of the sociology of knowledge. Previous conceptual-
izations of the field are critiqued, focusing cn the relationships
between central concepts. The importance of lancuage as a
mediating phenomenon in defining the sociology of knowledge is
discussed. After this the points of convergence as well as the
distinct feci of the sociolocy of knowledge, epistemology and
philosophy in general, the study of ideology and political
sociology, the philosophy of social science, and social
stratification are presented. In contrast to the "activist"
classical theory of knowledge, the "passivist" ccnception of
traditioeal sociology of knowledge is shown to be a primary
cmorro of nrrklamc i n\inl“inm objoctivityand relotivism which
have so plagued the field. This leads into the distinction
between the sociology of krewledge and sociological theory itself.
tlith all these delimitations of the tangential and peripheral
aspects of the relationships among these various areas of
inquiry, the author is prepared to venture his own definition of
the sociology of knowledge. Chapter III then ends with a partial
answer to the question, "What does the sociology of knowledge
have to offer us in terms of sccielogical theory?"
Chapter IV describes four modal types of consciousness,
the justification for this having been accomplished in the
definition of the seciolor:y of knot:ledge arrived et in
Chapter Ill. These four modes of consciousness are the
dialectical, analytical, synthetic, and phenomenological. Together
they form the core concepts of an exploratory model examining the
relationship of the sociology of knowledge to sociological theory.
This model is primarily the author's original contribution. The
next part of the model describes structured systems of knowledge
which correspond with the modal types of consciousness. Given
these, we can describe broadly-defined methodological orientations
in the social sciences which are most amenable to the four modes
of consciousness and correspondinc structured knowledge systems.
Finally, the kind of theoretical frameworks which are likely to
emerge from each of these clusters are defined, along with an
evaluation as to their scientific quality.
A brief sumnary of the study and its conclusions are
presented in Chapter V, as well as the limitations of the thes
and suggestions 35 to how it may contribute to further research.
The study in no way claims to be inclusive in its interpretation
of the subject ratter.
CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL DEVELOPXENT OF THE SOCIOLOGY
OF KNOWLEDGE
Since a major part of this thesis is definitional, the
task of arriving at a more precise delimitation of the sociology
of knowledge has been reserved for Chapter III. No detailed
analysis of previously existing definitions of the field is
included in Chapter II. However, it would be som2what facetious
to conduct a review of the literature without defining the
boundaries of the field, and for that reason a tentative definiton
is proposed simply for the heuristic purpose of allowing the
reader to have something in mnd as he considers the various
approaches to the sociolocy of knowledge. The author does not
view the field as the "social determination of ideas," or the
study of ideologies, or the study of some mental coTplex
determining historical activity. As traditionally understood,
however, all of the following are components of the sociology of
knowledge, each of them problematic in itself: conditioning
social factors and ideas making up human knowledge ("mental
productions"), as well as the relationship between the two. At
the end of this chapter the concluding remarks will, hopefully,
clarify the conceptual components of the sociology of knowledge,
6
I
preparing the way for a more precise definition. In the
meantime the sociology of knowledge is provisionally defined as
the study of the relationship between mental events and social
existence. This dEfirition is perhaps no better or worse for
the purpose at hand; it is vague enough to include under its
rubric all of the various approaches presented in this thesis.
At the end of Chapter II b(ith the diverse and common elenents in
these approaches will be sunrnarized.
Part A: The Structural Approach
By the "structural" approach to the sociology of knowledge
is simply meant the perspective which seeks to establish a certain
isomorphism of knowledge with the social structure in which the
croup or individual operates. In this section we include the
most seminal thinkers: Karl Marx, Emile Durkhein, and Karl
Mannheim. However, Karl Marx is only with some hesitation placed
in this category; orthodox interpretations would undoubtedly
classify him as a "strucluralist," but renewed examination of his
work shows that this is only partially correct. In fact, the
position usually identified as that of Marx is seen here to be
more that of Durkheim, who was explicitly anti-Marxian in his
polemic. Karl Mannheim represents perhaps the prototype
"paranoid thinker" of which :iinter Remmling speaks, though even
he attempted to find a way out of the intellectual morass in
which he found himself. In one sense, it can be shown that ail
these ren were pc!...itiv.!sts end perhaps both Mannheim end Dur!IJAm
8
were functionalists, although there have been several attempts
equate Marx with functionalism as well. Despite their
differences, hoo,ever, these three men show affinities in the
direction of a similar plane or dimension of thought. With this
in mind, we turn first to Karl Marx.
Karl Marx
The literature on Karl Marx is at once overwhelming and
still nhCecided on its interpretation of the thought of this man.
In the last decac!e in particular there has been reneac interest
in his work; sore authors speak of an early humanistic Marx;
others of his later scientific-theoretical work; and some still
espouse an orthodox quasi-religious Marxism.
6 
The relevance of
M3rx for the author's purposes can be summed in the following
statements:
a. In keeping with the general thesis of this study,
a large part of the writings of Marx are not
properly within the realm of the sociology of
knowledge as they are more a study of ideolonies,
although this work represents ore of the earliest
inceptive for-ulations of problems analogous to
those in the field.
b. Although there is considerable evidence of a
rather narrow econo-ic determinism in Marx's work,
there is at the same time just as much evidence to
indicate that he was corsciously very empirical
5Pobert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure
(New York: The Free Press, 1968 enlarged eCition), pp. 92-190;
Alfred G. Meyer, Marxis-: The Unity of Theo a and Practice 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1.47-67;), pp. 13-46; Arthur L.
Stinchco:te, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and World, 1961)T pp. 93-101.
6For en expositicn of these trends, see Pct,ert W.




and scientific in his analyses. Marx avoided
monistic cause and effect analysis in favor of
an empirical-dialectical methodology %.hich
assumes that an objective, almost positivistic
description of social reality is possible.7
c. The study restricts itself more to the statements
of Marx on consoiouaness itself and not with
substantive ideologies. The conception of false
consciousness, and concomitantly, those of
alienation and reification, are the roots of
Marx's positivism. This is all germane to the
construction of sociological theory, and is
therefore central to the object of this thesis.
d. As there is difficulty enough in interpreting
Marx's own thoucht, this thesis avoids the task
of interpreting the work of the disciples of
Marx.8
The first three of these points are scrutinized in creater depth
below.
Much of Marx's thouch rested on his distinction beteen
the material substructure of society (Unterbau) and its
ideolncical soperstructure (reherhau):
In the social production of their life, men enter into
definite relations that are indispensable and independent
of their will, relations of production which correspead
to a definite stage of development of their material
productive forces. The sum total of these relations of
production constitutes the economic structure of society,
the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political
superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of
social consciousness. The mode of production of material
7. more detailed aralysis of this point can be found in
Fuad Paali and 3. Brian Price, "The Empirical-Dialectical
Methodology of Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx," presented at the 1972
meetings of the Midwest Sociological Society in Kansas City.
Missouri (publication pending).
8
For a concise su=ary of nec-Marxist contributions, see
Adler, "The Pange of the Sociology of Knowledge," pp. 39-405.
Of particular ir17.oraaance is Klassen und Klassenbewu:stein by
George Lukacs. which has teen recently available in EnclIs as
History and Class Consciousness, trans. by Rodney Livingston(cambridce: M.I.T. Press, 1971 reprint of the 1923 edition).
411, •
10
life conditions the social, political and intellectual
life process in general. It is not the consciousness of
men that determines their being, but, on the contrary,
their social being detemines their consciousness.9
It is here that we find the root of the more orthodox translations
of Marx's work; all religious, political, and other such ideas
are seen to be a reflecticn or refraction of the economic base,
i.e., "the ruling ideas of every epoch are the ideas of the
ruling class.u10 Elsewhere the author has challenged such en
interpretation, pointing to the dialectical and sociolocical 
elements in Marx's suppositions; inferring that the relationship
between these variables is multi-causal; that Marx is not an
economic determinist; and that his efforts were directed to
confirming the foundation of science in concrete, empirical
reality rather than in some abstruse Platonic realm of idees.11
At any rate, Marx at best developed only an inchoate sociology
of knowledge: the corpus of his writings in this area instead
fall under the study of ideology.
With these assumptions briefly clarified, the thesis is
restricted to two limited aspects of Marxian thought: the
nature of consciousness, and the relationship of this to the
9Karl Marx, "Preface" to A Contribution to the Critieueof Political Eccrom., in rarx and [noels, Selected Works Toscow:Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), pp. 362-353.
10Karl rarx and Frederick Engels, The Gerrran Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947T-p. 39.
11Co-authored with Fuad Baali, "1bn Khaldun and KarlMarx on Social Channe and Social Theory," presented at te 1972rectings of thc: .nio Valley Sociological Society in London,
Ontario (publication pending).
11
construction of social theory. This in turn entails some
discussion of false consciousness, which is essentially a form
of alienation; and his empiricism, which is a logical outgrowth
of the conception of false consciousness. In the citation to
the Preface above, it can be seen that according to Marx
consciousness does not exist a priori but is a social product,
evolving from men in their actual life-process. That
consciousness is a social, and not an individualistic phenomenon,
provides a connection with Marx to the social behaviorism of
George Herbert Mead:
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness,is at first directly interwoven with the material activityand the material intercourse of men, the lancuaoe of reallife. Conceivinc, thinking, the mental :ntercourse ofmen, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of theirmaterial behavior.12
In the above passage Marx mentions that consciousness is
"at first" and "at this stage" interwoven with the material
a:tivity of men, which could really be any variable one desires
to choose. This suggests that ideas and conceptions can develop
an autonomy of their own. In The German Ideoloey.we are told
that:
Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the rulingindividuals and, above all, from the relationships whichresult from a given stace of the mode of production andin this way the conclusion has been reached that historyis always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy toabstract from these various ideas "the ide3," "die Idee.aetc., as the dominant force in history, and thus tounderstand all these separate ideas and concepts as
17-Karl rarx and Frederick Encelc, The German Idcoloy,p. 13.
12
"forms of self-determination" on the part of the
concept developing in history.13
If these ideas gain such an autonomy, then they can in turn have
an influential effect on the course of history. However, Marx
does not systematically carry out the ramifications of such a
premise.
Marx did make a distinction between illusion, unclear
ideas, and knowledge, which is the result of scientific investi-
gation. When man is living under illusions he has a false
consciousness of his true condition. This implies that objective
knowledge is oossible and is the basis of his empirical thought:
Empirical observations must in each separate instance
bring out empirically, and without any mystification
and speculation, the connection of the social and
political structure with production. . . . Its premises
are men, not in any fantastic isolaticn or abstract
definition, but in their actual, empirically perceptible
process of development under definite conditions.14
This empiricism is not incompatible with the necative, critical
thinking which he took from Hegel.
are in fact integrally related.15
On another level false consciousness
It would seen as if the two
presents itself in




See Irving M. Zeitlin, Marxisr": A Re-Examination
(rrinceton: D. Vali hostrond Company, 196?), p. 8.
13
by Joachim Israel, Peter Berger, and Anton C. Zijderveld.16 This
is usually connected with Marx's analysis of the fetischism of
commodities, but is found orl a more general level:
My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape
of that which the living shape is the real community,
the social fabric, althouch at the present day general
consciousness is an abstraction from real life and
confronts it with hostility.I7
Thus man is alienated from the community by a social consciousness
which is an abstraction and not a living community. Marx is well
aware of consciousness itself as a phenomenon which at times acts
almost as an independent variable in historical periods. He can
be placed in the structural approach to the sociology of knowledge
only with some reservation: his methodological principles which
were developed in part from his ideas about consciousness miticate
against any form of strict determinism. Marx is thorouhly-
dialectical his thought and in his analysis of the relationship
between men's conceptions and their socio-economic matrix of
behavior.
Emile Durkheim
Although he denied that his thebi. - f knowledge and
religion was a restatemelt of histcral materialism, Durkheim
was clearly indebted to Marx's distinction of Unterbeuneberbaw,
16Joachim Israel. Al:enation From Marx to Modern Sociology:
(Boston: Allyn and neon, 1971), pp. 255-342; Peter Berger crii
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York:
Anchor Books, 1967)7 and Anton C. Zijderveld, The Abstract Society 
(New York: Anchor Bookc, 1970).
17, •Karl Marx, The Ecororic and Philoso?hic ManvIripts of




as well as by Varx's idea that social existence determines social
consciousness.
18
However, as Zeitlin points out, DJrkr:ein was
wrong in thinking that Marx treated conscousress as "mere
epiphenomena" and goes on to say that "the real divergence occurs
when Durkheim generalizes Marx's proposition beyond socioeconomic
19relationships to include other social 
relationships." Durkheim
saw social structures and arrangements as the principal deter-
minants of behavior--this is the basis of his concept of collective
conscience. He believed that the problems of a theory of knowledge
were inexorably tied in with the problems of the sociology of
religion. In The Elementarv Forms of Religious Life, he attempts
to show how the categories of understanding--in the classic
Aristotelian sense of ideas of time, space, class, number, cause,
etc.--were born in primitive religious belief and thus a prnri,.
0' religious thought. But more than this: if religion is
preeminently social, as he concluded, then "religious repre-
sentations are collective representations which express collective
realities."
20
As the catecories are of a religious origin, then
they too are social affairs and the product of collective thought.
In our states of consciousness, for instance, the categories of
space and time are socially conditioned: "A calendar expresses
the rhythm of the collective activities, while at the Fare time
18 .Irving A. Zeitlin, Ideolocy and the Deyelcr,7ent of
Sociolodic0 Theory (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 19f), p. 276.
19
Ibid.
2 °Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Relicicus Life
(e.4 York: The Free Press, f9i:gt—PT-22.
15
, "its function is to assure their regularity..21 Similarily, in
some Australin tribes space is conceived in the form of a spatial
circle because the camp is organized in a circular form. The
circle is divided up exactly like the tribal circle and is in its
image.
22
Thus classificatory thought has social origins, although
these classifications have achieved a certain autonomy from their
original origins. These problems which Durkheim dealt with are
the ones which have been carried over in the modern sociology of
knowledge. However, he did address himself to questions of a
traditional philosophical nature.
The epistemological question which preoccupied rArkheim
was the debate between classical empiricism and Kantian a
priorism. Durkheim believed that the empirical position could
result in irrationalism as universality and necessity are rpriue.ri
to pure appearance, or illusion, thus denying all objective reality
to logical life, which is based on the categories. On the other
find, the a priorists (rationalists) believed the world to have a?
logical aspect which could be expressed through reason. Durkheim
believed that his idea of collective representations was the key
to a solution to these two opposing theories of knowledge. As
Zeitlin says;
I
were wrong in assuming that knowledge was the result
were wrong in believing that knowledge was unnediated
by thought categories. Knowledge is indeed mediated
Durkheim therefore concluded that the "empiricists"
of an individual's irmediete sensory perceptions; they





as the "rationalists" claimed; however the categories
are not immanent but social in nature. All collective renresentations depend on their common underlying
social structures. . . .43
Durkheim's work clearly belongs, then, in the structural approach
to the sociology of knowledge.
24
In his claims about the
influence of social structure on thought he went far beyond Karl
Marx. As with this thesis, it can be said that Cori:heim was
cohcerned:with how states of consciousness are structured in the
huran mind; although he goes further in relating this directly to
the social milieu in which the individual exists.
Karl Mannheim 
Max Scheler was the first to introduce the term sociology
of knowledge (Wissenssoziolooie), but in the United States Karl
Mannheim is the name usually associated with this
all thinkers in the sociology of knowledge, he has been given the
most attention and subjected to the most thorough-going analysis.
A detailed introduction to the man and his work has been written
recently by Kurt Wolff,
25 
and several excellent, in-depth
23 o -Irving .... ceitlin, Ideology and the Development ofSociological Theory, p. 277.
24See Remmling, The Road to Suspicion, pp. 15-22, for aconcise summary of the work of Marcel Granet and Levy-Bruhl, whichis very similar to that of Durkheim.
Kurt H. Wolff, From Karl Mannheim (New York: OxfordUniversity Press. 1971), pp. xi-cxxxiii. In addition see PaulKecskemeti, "Introduction," in Karl Mannheim, Essays on theSociolcov of Knowledoe, trens. by Paul Kecske:-...eti (London:Routlede and i.e7an paul. 1952), pp. 1-32; Lcuis Wirth, "Preface,"in Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utooia, Lp. x-xxx; Peimut R. Vagner,"The Scope of Mannoeim's lninking," Social Research, 20 (April,
11
expositions of his sociology of knowledge are available.
26
Mannheim finds few defenders of his work, with most criticisms
focusing on the self-defeating relativism of his position; i.e.,
if all thought is existentially determined, then even this
proposition is, ipso facto, socially conditioned and is open to
question as to its validity.27 These ar9u7ents have been stated
and restated to the point where it is a mere act of boring
repetition to go over them again. Rather, the basic outlines of
Mannheim's sociology of knowledge are presented here, and the
1953), pp. 100-109; Gunter Rermling, "Karl rannheim: 7:er.ision
of an Intellectual Portrait," Social Forces, 40 (October, 1951),
pp. 23-40.
26
See especially Robert K. Merton, "Karl Mannheim and the
Sociolooy of Knowledge,' in Social Theory and Social Str_oture,
pp. 543-562; Jacques J. Maquet, The Scciolocy of Knowled.,:e, it:
Structure and Its Relation to the Philosonhv of Knowleoce: A
Critical Analysis of the Systurs of Karl l'.annheim and itirim A.
Sorokin (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), pp. -19-10-4; lryinc Zeitlin,
Ideo16-ay and the Development of Sociolocical Theory, pp. 281-310.
27These are, in. addition to the references cited in the
preceding footnote: Alexander von Schelting, "Review of 1(2eolocie
und Utopie," American Sociological Review, 1 (1936), pp. 664-
672; Arthur Child, "The Theoretical Possibility of the Fociolocy
of Knowledge," Ethics, LI (July, 1941), pp. 392-418; "The
Existential Determination of Thcucht," Ethics, LII (January, 1942),
pp. 153-185; "The Problem of Imputation in the Sociolc:y of
Knowledge," Ethics, LI (January, 1941), pp. 200-219; "Ti,c Problem
of Truth in the Sociology of Knowledce," Ethics, LVIII (October,
1947), pp. 18-34; Virail G. Hinshaw, "The Epistemological Relevance
of Mannheim's Sociology of Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy, XI_
(February, 1943), pp. 57-72; Frank E. Hartung, 77-robljT6rhe
Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy of Science, 19 (January, 19F,2),
pp. 17-32; T. 3. Bottor-ore, "Sore Reflections on the Sociolou of
Knowledge," British Journal of Socioloav, 7 (Marcn, 19E6), pp. S2-
58; Robert H. Coombs, "Karl rannheim, Episte—ology and the
Sociology of Knowledge," Sociolnoical Quo.teriv, 7 (Sprinc, 1C*6),pp. 229-233; ;oyo:.:.sa Fuse, "Sociolegy of KroJetse tvisited,
Some Rerainino Preblems and Prospects," Sociolsoical Inquiry al
(Sprin9, 1967), ;:p. 241-253.
Or'
18
epistemological argurents will be picked up briefly again in
Chapter III.
Mannheim--sometimes called the "bourgeois Marx"--begins
his study with a distinction between the particular and total
conceptions of ideology:
The particular conception of ideolooy is implied when
the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas
and representations advanced by our opponent. They are
regarded as more or less conscious discuises cf the
real nature of a situation, the true reoconition of
which would not be in accord with his interests . . .
[the total conception of ideology] refers to the
ideology of an age or of a concrete histori co-social
group, i.e. of a class, when we are concerned with the
characteristics and composition of the total structure
of the mind of this epoch or of this group.28
Thus, Mannheim portrays a situation in which all thought is believed
to be ideologically inspired and distrust prevails. However, when
the analyst begins to subject all points of view--his own and is
adversary's--to ideological analysis, the sociology of knowledge
is approached:
With the emergence of the general formulation of the
total conception of ideology, the simple theory of
ideology develops into the sociology of knowledge.
What was once the intellectual armanent of a party
is transformed into a method of resrch in social
and intellectual history generally.
Karl Mannheim was aware of the dangers of a relativism in
which all thought beco7es invalid once its social origins are
pointed out. To counteract such an interpretation, he developed
the concepts of relaticnalism and perspectivism, which together
28Ideolo9y and Utopia, pp. 55-56.
291Ad., p. 78.
19
formed a prapatic criterion of truth similar to Pierce and
Dewey in the United States. "Perspective" (Aspekstruktur) refers
to the total conception of ideology, but is a substitution of tho
word "ideology," which has moral connotat4.ons. with a word that
takes its stand cn a noological plane, or the plane of logical
30
thought. Arektstruktur refers to how a perceiving individual
sees an object, which of its elements he orasps, and how he
constructs a context in the process of thinking. Mannheim
attempted to establish an empirical branch of the sociology of
knowledge in this manner and applied his concepts in the essay
Das konservative Denken.
31
His treatment of relativism, however,
is the epistemological consequence of empirical research. This
he thouoht to be the most important aspect of the sociology of
knowledge, and it is this same point which evokes the stronNrt
objections to his work. To escape relativism he invented the
term "relationalism"; that is, objective thought is guaranteed
by the freischwebende Intellicenz, a relatively classless stratum
of the "socially unattached intelligentsia." This group seeks
reality by escaping ideological and utopian thought. By utopian
thought Mannheim simply means a system of ideas which is oriented
to4ard cLange of the existing society; whereas ideology is
concerned with the preservation of the existing order.
Essentially, as Robert Merton points out, with the concepts of
relationalism and perspectivism Mannheim has arrived at almost
301:aciut, The SLcio1o7,L of Knowledce, p. 22.




the same interpretation of the Rickert-Weber formulation of
Wertbeziehuno., which holds that values are relevant to the
formulation of the scientific problem but are not relevant to
the validity of the results.
32 
,
Gradually, then, Karl Mannheim attempted to move away
from his historicism and Establish the sociology of knowledge on
an empirical basis. Toyomasa Fuse sums up Mannheim's efforts as
follows:
(1) empirical studies of the relation between thought
and reality; (2) the search for criteria by which to
distinguish values; and (3) the elaboration of a new
theory of knowledee which shall take, finally, accQunt
of the discoveries of the sociology of knowlede."
After a tortuous intellectual. struggle, Mannheim arrived at
essentially a shaky synthesis between historicism and pcsitivism.
In addition, he provides us with a functional theory of konwle4ge
in that particular thought styles function to maintain or threaten
social structures. In this thesis, the epistemological quandry
which enmeshed Mannheim is avoided by adopting a dialectical 
interpretation of the relationship between thought and social
structure.
32Merton, "Karl !.!annheim and the Sociology of Knowledge,"
p. 559. Marlis Kruger atterpts to refute this point in his
"Sociology of Knowledge and Social Theory," Berkelty Journal of
Sociology, XIV (1969), pp. 156-157.
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Part B: The Cultural Approach
In contrast to the structural approach, the two men
considered in this section--Pitirim A. Sorokin and Talcott
Parsons--are avowedly anti-Marxian and seek instead to locate
the source of knowledge in cultural values, as with Parsons;
and cultural mental complexes, as the case with Sorokin. These
cultural factors are taken as independent variables. However,
the work of Sorcin and Parsons can be seen as an over-reaction
to Marxian sociology; they have failed to see that an interpre-
tation of Marx as a strict materialist or economic determinist is
simply not true. In a sense they have placed themselves in the
same position as that which they criticize by reversing the
causal direction implied between ideas and social structure. The
word "causal" must be used here with soe reservation, as the
functional methodology of both Parsons and Sorokin, especially the
latter's "logico-meaningful" method, attempts to skirt this kind
of imagery. However, eo establish links of a logical order
between phenomena at the sere time may confirm the existence of
meaninoful relationships. Thus it is not improper to speak of
causal relationships, i.e., of independent and dependent
variables.
34
Sorokin has contributed more than Parsons to the
sociology of knowledge, and this analysis begins with his we*.
34Maquot, The Scciolor_v of KnowlEdre, pp. 163-1,67.
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Ntirim A. Sorokin 
Unlike the structuralists such as Marx and Mannheim,
Sorokin looks at "cultural mentalities from which knowledge
systems are derived; his is essentially an idealistic and
emanationist theory of the seciology of knowledge:
One of the main tasks of the so-called sociology of
knowledge (;!issenssoziolodie) is a study of the
factors whicn conditton tne essential contents,
configurations, and transformations of the rental life
of an individual or of a group: their language,
scientific ideas, relicious and other beliefs . .
and their set of values in general. The sociology of
knowledge, or, rore exactly, the sociology of mental
life, tries to answer the basic questions of hew and
why the mental life of arv given individual or group
happens to be such as it is . . . and why the mental
life of various persons or collectivities is often
quite different. The sotiology of mental life
endeavors to elucidate these problems through a study
of the mentalities of vast cultures and societies
(racrosocioicy cf mental life) and through that of
te mental lio of A civen individual (microsociology
of mental life).=.0
Sorokin's monumental work, Social and Cultural Dynamics,
is an effort to investigate these problems on a macrosociological
scale.36 Every culture can be characterized by its system of
truth and reality; the main categories being the Ideational,
Idealistic, and Sensate mentalities oe systems of knowledge.
Sorokin accumulates massive evidence to show the fluctuation of
these mentalities throughout history. He notes that these
classifications have probably never existed in pure form, but
35Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Sociolor:y of My Mental Life," in
Pitirii7, A. Sorokin in Review, ed. by Philip J. Allen (Durham:
Duke University Pri.ss, p. 3.
3 5Fitirim A. Scrckin, Social and Cultural nvna-ics, (4
Vols.; New York: An-arican Compdny, 1937).
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that the Sensate and ideational cultural fcrms have been part of
the coposition of all integrated cultures. In Ideational culture
reality is perceived as nonsensate and nonmaterial; supersensory
critieria are relied upon as its system of truth, and -;t. is
spiritual and stresses everlasting Being (Sein). In Sensate
culture reality is vie.;:ed with the sense organs; here the stress
is on Becoming (:.:erden). Sensate culture is characterized by
change, flux, evolution, and progress. In brief, its major
premises are the opposite of ideational culture. The Idealistic
cultural mentality is a mixed form which appears to be logically
integrated into a more or less balanced unification of Ideational
and Sensate cultural premises. In addition, empiricism is
dominant in Sensate culture; mysticism and fideism in Ideatiooll
(the truth of faith). rther indices Sorokin has constructed
indicate that realism correlates positively with the truth of the
senses (sensate), and conceptualism with the truth of reason
(idealistic culture).37 Each of these cultural mentalities
conveys a system of truth, but to Sorokin true reality is only
obtainable throuch his "integralist" notion of truth: this
includes empirical and logical criteria as well as a "supersensory,
super-rational metalci:ical act of 'intuition' or 'mystical
71
- This bears a similarity to F. S. C. Northrop, whoattributes to eastern cultures the primacy of "the aestheticcorponent" ard to the west "the theoretic corponent": the forerrelies on the scrilms, the latter rationalizes and theorizes;see, The rceting 04" East and West (New York: Collier Eocks,
1946).
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experience'."38 Sorokin believes that with the integralist
notion of truth he has achieved a synthesis of idealism and
materialism.
For the purposes of this thesis, we can see how these
cultural mentalities affect scientific theory, indeed define it:
"Scientific theory thus is but an opinion made 'creditable' and
'fashicylable' by the type of prevalent culture."39 Sorokin
delves into this in his book Sociocultural Causality, 1pace, 
Time, in which certain fundamental categories are seen as
prerequisites of all coherent thought and all knoAedge of
facts.40 He quotes Durkheim's analysis of the spatial organi-
zation of the Australian Aborigines with approval, but sees the
concepts of space and time as an expression of the dominant
cultural mentality rather than a function of group structure.
Also, as with Schutz, Sorokin does not believe that the positive,
mathematical sciences are independent of cultural influence, as
opposed to Marx and Mannheim.
Despite some criticism, then, the author agrees with
Maquet, who concludes that in Sorokin's sociology of knowledge
the independent variable is itself a mental production.
The three premises of culture are nothing else but
philosophic positions . . . thus, because the independent
38Sorokin, Social and Cultural !Dynamics, 1, p. 36.
39
Quoted by Robert Merton and Bernard Barber, "Sorokin'sFormulations in the Sociology of Science," in Pitirim A.
Sorokin in Review, p. 334.
40pitirim A. Sorokin, Sociocultural Causality, Spau!,_




variable is sociocultural and especially ber.Fiuse it
is exterior to each particular field of knyiedge,
we can speak with e9cd reason, it seems, of Sorokin's
Wissenssoziolcoie.41
Talcott Parsons
Talcutt Parsons' orientation to the sociology of
knowledge fits into his attempt to construct a general theory of
social action. Drawing mostly on Max Weber he states his question
as not whether nonempirical existential ideas are always to be
found in social systems, but whether important features of these
social systels can be shown to be functions of variations in the
content of these ideas..42 Parsons conceives of two problems in
the sociology of knowledge: (1) the relationship between
institutionalized values and empirical conceptions of social
systems; and (2) the relation of values to cultural systeris. In
the article which he devoted specifically to the sociolory of
knowledge, he gave more attention to the first, although the
latter was ultimately more important to him. He is concerned
with how value systems affect bodies of knowledge.43 Parsons
believes that empirical-rational knowledge is an independent
aspect of all cultural systems:
The socioloy of knowledge should not be identified
with the sociolocy of culture, which is a wider 
41Maquet, The Sociology of Knowledoe, pp. 187-188.
42Talcott Parsons, "The Role of Ideas in Social Action,"
American Sociological Review, 3 (1939), pp. 657-658.
43Talcott Parsons, "An Approach to the Sociology of
Knowledge," in his Socioloyical Therrv and rcdern Soci.ety.
(A-4 York: Free Press, 196717p. 146.
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category. Only throu0 an analys;.s of both social and
cultural systems and of their interpenetratien and
interdependence, however, can an adequate sociology of
knowledge be worked
Criticisms of Parsons' sociCogy of knowledge are necessarily
bound with criticisms of hie entire theoretical framework; here
ample work has been done.45 Suffice to say that in his sociology
of knowledge, as with Sorokin, cultural values and ideas are taken
as independent variables, which is the direct opposite of the
position taken by the structuralists. Both views are one-sided.
Pa -t C: The Phenomenological Approach
The phenomenological approach to the sociology of knowledge
is the least understood in American sociolooy, deriving from
philosophical traditions that are almost strictly Euroeean whieh is
expressed in a terminology often difficult to grasp. Phenomnology
is actually an attempt, however, to establish philosophy as e pure
science and is not incompatible with many of the basic postulates
commonly accepted by social scientkts. Helmut R. Wagner has
defined phenomenolov as being concerned with "that cognitive
reality which is embodied in the processes of subjective human
44Ibid., p. 165. In addition see chapter viii, "Belief
Systems and the Role of Ideas," in Talcett Parsons, The Social
System (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 326-3?2. P7ere
Parsons discusses the prevalence of cultural patterning of
knowledge in the form of belief systems, systems of expressive
symbols, and systems of value orientations.
455ee Max Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott






However, there is a great deal mre involved in
phenomenological analysis. Therefore as a prelude to a discussion
of the phenomenological approach to the sociology of knowledge
a brief surnary of the thought of the most systematic phenomeno-
logical philoscpher, that of Edmund Husserl, precedes the
discussion of Schutz. Of the other four thinkers in this
section, particular attention is given to Alfred Schutz and
Peter Berger. Max Scheler studied under Husserl, but diverged
from this philosopher far more than did Schutz; Scheier's
contributions are presented first as they represent somewhat cf
a synthesis of between the two previous approaches, the structural
and cultural. Following Scheler, the sociology of knowledge of
Werner Stark is examined. Stark was phenomenological in his
methodology but original in the core of his work. After Stark,
the insights of Schutz and Berger are analyzed.
Max Scheler
As previously nbted, Scheler was the first to use the term
"sociology of knowledge," or Wissenssoziologie. Unfortunately.
his Die Wissenformen und die Gesellschaft (1920 has yet to be
published in English. The Ensuing summary of his conception of
the sociology of knowledge is based primarily, then, on secondary
46 uIn Preface" to Alfred Schutz on Phenorercloov end
Social Peletiers: Selected lo-itincs (Chicago: University of
Cnicago Press, 11-70), p. 12.
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sources.47 Seheler contended that social factors do not
determine the content or validity of ideas, saying that:
. . . the sociological character of all knowledge, of
all foms of thought, is unquestionable. However,
this (sociological determination of thought) refers
cnly to the selecton of objects of knowledge, which
is determined by the controlling perspective of social
interests (herrschenden so7ialen InteressencersPektive).
:either the ccntent nor the validity of Knowlecge is
sociologically determined, but the forms of the mental
processes by means of which knowledge is acqired are
always and necessarily codetermined sociolcgicelly,
i.e. by the social structure.48
Scheler was influenced by Husserl's phenomenology in that he
regarded the cognitive act as insight into eternal essences, as
a contemplative participation in these eternal truths.
Lig 
Thus he
created a metaphysical dualism; claiming that there is a realm of
idea value-essences and a realm of concrete existential facts.
Drawing from flarx's distinctinn of substructurefsuper<tructure,
he distinguished between Kultursoziologie and Relsoziologie.
The relationship between these is expressed in his "law cf the
order of effectiveness of the ideal and real factors" (Gesetz der 
Ordnuncj der Wirksamkeit der Idealfaktoren und Realfaktoren).
50
The mind is expressed in ideal factors and determines what thoughts
47
Especially Remmling, Road to Suspicion, pp. 32-39; J. R.Staude, Max Scheler, 1874-1928 (New York: Free Press, 1967),pp. 163-202; rerton, "The Sociology of Knowledoe," in Social Thep, and Social Structure, pD. 510-542. For early criticisms see PauArthur Schlipp, "The 'Formal Problems' of Scheler's Socic1o4 ofKnc4lede," The Philosophical Review, 35 (March, 1927), Pp. 101"1a.
48Wissenformen, p. 58; quoted in Staude, Scheler, p. 166.
491emm1ing, Road to Susicion, p. 33.
5411bid.. p. 37.
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can be created by the culture. The sobstructural factors--power
relations, etc.--are "necative factors of realization." However,
and for this Scheler has been termed the Catholic Nietzsche, the
"positive factor of realization" is the free will and actions of
leaders, the elite who help open the "sluice gates" for the
R1mental stream b;, preparing the masses for new ideas.- Thus,
"real history" only hinders, facilitates, retards or accelerates
the realization (Auswirkuro) of ideas; that it'ney ray pass from
possibility to actuality. The real history of any supranational
culture (Hochkultur) is summed up in a law of three phases
(Gesetz der drei Phasen je vorwieoender Primarkausalitat der
Rea)faktcren). The independent variables in real history are,
in Scheler's werds:
1. A phase in which blood relationships of every kindand the institutions tat rationally govern tern . . .form the independent oreanizational form of groups;that is, they determine the scce pf what can happenfrom other causes of a real sort, for example, politicaland economic.
2. A phase in which this causal primacv--understood inthe same limited sense of the determination of scope--passes over to the factors of political power, in thefirst place to the efficacy of the state.3. A phase in which the eccnorn . receives the causalprimacy and the "economic factors" determine realevents, though for intellectual history they merelyopen and close the sluice gates of the spirit. 2
Scheler was influenced somewhat by Marxism, and in fact drew up a
table of class-determined Frooensities to think in a certecn way.
In it, for example, Scheler listed tendencies of the lower class
51Ibid
52Ussenformen, pp. 44-45; Staude, rax Scheler, p. 175.
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to have a prospective tire consciousness and a mechanistic
conception of the world; an emphasis on materialism,
realism, becoming, pragmatism, and a search for contradictions.
In contrast, the upper class has tendencies toward a retrospective
time consciousn2ss and a teleological conception of the world;
with an emphasis on spiritualism, idealism, being, intellectualisr,
and a search for harmonies.
53
To Scheler ideologies were
rationalizations of the interests and prejudices of a particular
social group, whereas knowledge was the objective perception
of reality. Thus he believed that these preconditions exist
for class prejudices, althou2h they could be overcome, in
principle, by every individual member of a class.
We can see that Scheler synthesized materialism and
idealism in his sociology of knowledge. but this dualistic
metaphysics has been severely criticized:
Clearly, if these notions were to be taken seriously--and we must not forget that according to Scheler thegap to be bridged between substructIre and super-structure is whole gulf between physical and meta-physical--a meeting of the two could not be imaginedat all. For how could a mindless movement select foritself ideas that woula suit it; and how or why shouldideas descend from their heavenly abode, incarnatethemselves in this world, or mingle with the dross anddirt of these lower spheres754
Scheler's sociology of knowledge, then, escapes the narrower
conception of the social determination of ideas, but his
530issenfor, en, p. Staude, aX Scheler, p. 186.
54Werner Stark. 7;-e Ecciology cf Krowledge: Pn Essay isAid of a Deeper Understantinc of the History of Ideas—New York:Free Press, 1956Y, p. 264.
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postulation of a supratemporal, metaphysical sphere of truth is
not something we can prove or disapprove. In the context of
empirical research it is completely meaningless. Eut on the
other hand it can be said that there are historical variants of
repeated themes or ideas, which is in part due to the autonomy
of thought structures developed over time. Realfaktoren may at
least create the situation in which men can choose among many
of these predefined ideas. Even Staude says that "in spite of
all his Platonic exaltation of ideas, there is a tendency in
Scheler's sociology of knowledge to reduce ideas to the level of
epiphenoena.„55 If so, then Scheler has failed to achieve a
synthesis between the structural and cultural approaches in his
phenomenology; in fact, he bypasses the cultural realm into oae
of trenc,.eene,ItAl edctic eccc'r"'c
Werner Star*
In contrast to those who have placed the subject matter of
the sociology of knowledge as the study of the ideological nature
of all thought, Verner Stark is unique (althouch perhaps he comes
close to Sorokin's integralist philosophy) in that he views the
ultimate task of the sociology of knowledge to be a search for
truth, to supercede ideological distortion of thought. Although
he falls somewhat outside of the phenomenolcgical tradition, he
shares with these people, especially with Scheler, a belief in a
transcendental re lm of truth:
55Stc.ude, Xax Scheler, p. 1E0.
4.sipopopproAppripiew4P4P4ter.l. 1,4111111411rliMV
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We conceive the philosophical anthropolov which
will reconcile and so to speak roof over the mutually
alien worlds of ideas which the history of our race
has engendered to be attainable Empirically and
inductively from observation and experience, not
speculatively and by reeans of a priori fiat. The
absolute is recognizable, so we believe, in, through
and under the relative. . . In fact and in truth,
observation gives us knowledge that is essentially
relative and absolute at the Sane time, and the main
task of scilolarship--a schelarshio which is not pure
fact-findinc, but also aware of ultimate philosophical
problems--consists precisely in the separation of the
absolute from the realtive, of the moee than phenomenal
from the no more than phenomenal. The absolute is for
us, in other words, the common factor in the relative.
Our procedure must be that of the matheretician in
face of a series of exeressions in which a ccmmon
factor occurs: he extracts the common factor and
sets it in front of a pair of brackets, within which
the elements of irreducible diversity stand collected.
This operation (akin what in philosophy is knoen as
the phenomenological method) seems to us the only one
capable of leading beyond the historical manifold
without doing violence to it.55
r4ifi cerokin, Stark dietineuishoc between a
macrosociolocy of knowledge, which fixes its attention on the
inclusive society and its influence; and the microsociology of
knowledce, which is concerned with the narrower world of
scholarship and art,
57 
but he excludes the former from consideration
in his extremely scholarly and erudite book. A full chapter ill
The Sociolocy of Knowledce is devoted to a critique of ideology,
which he considers to be an historical forerunrIer of the sociology
of knowledge, but whose study really belongs to psychology. The
author will return to this in Chapter III of the thesis.
55Stark, The Socioloa of KnowlPe-e, p. 197.
57Ibid., p. 20.
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In a discussion of social determination and individual
freedom, Stark affirms that "individual thought and social being
from an indissoluble unity."
58 
Although found only in the
individual, human consciousness is essentially social ad is
always related to a system of social conceptions and values.
This axiological factor, which is operative in the ihception
and constituticn of a world view, is the essence of Stark's own
sociology of knowledge and is expressed in the following scheme:
59
The subject The Categorial Layer of the ind
and his The Physical Apparatus of Perception
approach The Axiolo.?ieal Layer of the find  The concern
 of the scc.
The objective The Ubjects of Knowledge of knowledge
world The ilaterials of Knowledge
Thus in Stark's sociology of knowledge the mind makes certain'
prejudgments, or value judgments, with regard to the relative
importance or unimportance, of the "numberless separable and
eligible strands of objective reality."60 However, although the
axiological system determines what is to be selected from the
materials of knowledge, it does not and cannot determine how this
selection is to be carried out. Stark believes that his sociology
of knowledge, if properly handled, "can lead to an Cbjectivity in
the treatment of social and historical reality incomparably deeper





and the influence of a basic axiological layer in the human
mind. 
6l
In terms of the Marxian distinction between substructure
and superstructure, Stark gains theoretical insight by combining
a "theory of functional interrelation" with a "theory of Cective
affinity." The former simply refers to the functionalization of
knowledge, the latter to the tendency of certain ideas to have an
affinity with a given stage of historical develcbment (similar to
Max Veber on the protestant ethic). Stark sees a gradual
convergence between substructure and superstructure and a
reciprocal influence between the two, but adds that "because it
is easier to understand the superstructure throngh the
substructure than the other way about,"
62 
more emphasis is gion
to social determination:
. . . The true basis of social deterrination, so far as
human thought is concerned, is the process of social
interaction, that ail-important process which . . . is
also, and Essentially, a meeting and raking of mind and
mind. Social life, fcr us, is in the last analysis scme-
thing that happens, not sorething that is, a flow, not a
substance, a stream of relationships, not a hard and fast
thing. But in this living stream or process, there is a







On the one hand, institutions form themselves and achieve
comparative fixity, on the other hand modal ideas; and
both poles thus produced--ideas and institutions--are






which has brought them forth. Social life as a process
is given direction by certain guiding values which
emerge as dominant in the living interplay of individual
and group volitions and strivincs.bi
He then quotes Ziegenfuss as saying "the social as such is neither
subjective or objective. It realizes itself at the same time
correlatively in two directions--mental inwardness and the external
world. 
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Verner Stark opened a new dimension of the ociolooy of
knowledge with his emphasis on the axiological nature of the
mind. Mind, or consciousness, is structured into a choosing 
phenomenon.
Alfred Schutz and Edmund Pusserl
In Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sczialen Uelt (Vienna, 1932)65
Alfred Schntz began the task of nnn<tructing A PhAnOTAn0102ir.?1
sociology by synthesizing the work of Edmund Husserl and !,!ax Veber.
Only recently have sociologists in the United States begun to give
his contributions serious consideration; to6ay phenomenological




65A translation by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert is
now available as The Phenomenolody. of the Social World (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, li)6717 For the purpose of thiS
thesis, hoever, this v:;-,rk is not central. The most relevnt
essay is "Comron sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human
Action," Flilpscrhv and Phenomenological Pesearch, XIV (September,
1553), pp. 1-37.
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Phenomenological philosophy began with Hegel, was given
a strong impetus by Kant and Ernst Cassirer, but developed in its
most radical form by Edmund Husserl. This philosopher wanted to
arrive at "philosophy as a rigorous science"; that is, throuoh
critical and systematic investigation philosophy cculd attain
absolutely valid knowledge of things.66 This was to be
accomplished by reducing everything to primary "presuppositions"
which have no need of clarification because they are immediately
evident. The method for accomplishing this was t:ofcld: eidectic
and phenomenological reduction, of which only the latter is
important to this thesis. Eidectic reduction leads us from the
realm of facts to that of general essences; phenomenological
reduction makes us pass from the world of realities to that of
their ultimate presuppositions. Of the different forms of
phenomenological reductions, the most important for us is that
of the reduction of the cultural world to the world of our
immediate experiences (Lebenswelt). This is the natural world
which correlates with our primordial, orioinal lived experiences
(Erlebnisse); when we go back to this immediate, given nature of
experience Husserl is speaking of "intentional analysis."
Intentionality is a property of our consciousness which is always
directing this consciousness to that which it itself is not; in
other words, every act of consciousness, in order to be an act,
66T HS discussion of Fusserl is based on Joseph J.
Kockelmans, "Some Fundamental Themes of Husserl 's Phenomenology,"
in Kockelmans, Phenomenoloo; (New York: Anchor Books, 1967),
pp. 24-36.
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demands a certan object because every conscious act intends
something. In simpler terms, Friedrichs defines phenomenological
reduction as "the apperception of the impact of phenomena on one's
consciousness devoid of reference to the actual presence or
absence of external objects."
67
These are the bare outlines
of Husserl's phenomenology which Schutz adapted to sociology.
We consider here three aspects of Schutz's work: (1) a
general summary of his phenomenological sociolecy, (2) more
specifically, his ideas on knowledge; and (3) his synthesis of
empiricism and subjectivism in his scientific method. These
will be intermingled, however, in the following exposition. A
cogent summation of some of his core ideas is to be found in
the passage below:
All our knowledae of the world, in cemmnn sense es
well as in scientific thinkinc, involves constructs,
namely a set of abstractions, generalizations,
formalizations, idealizaticns specific to the
respective level of thought oreanizaticn. Strictly
speaking, there are no such thinns as facts, pure and
simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected
from a universal context by the activities of the
mind. They are, therefore, always interpreted facts,
namely, either facts looked at as detached from their
context by an artificial abstraction or facts
considered in their particular setting. In either
case they carry along their interpretational inner
and outer horizon. This does not mean that, in daily
life or in science, we are unable to grasp the reality
of the world. It just means that we grasp merely
certain aspects of it, namely those which are relevant
to us either for carrying on our business cf living or
from the point of view of a body of accepted rules of
procedure of thinking called the method of science.68
"Friedrichs, A Sociology of Seciolocv, p. 303.
"Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of
Human Action," pp. 2-3.
••
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Thus we perceive and interpret the world through a series of
common-sense constructs taken from the reality cf everyday life.
Scientific constructs are designed to supercede the constructs of
common-sense thought; they are, so to speak, constructs of the
second degree, or constructs of the constructs made by the actors
in the social setting which the scientist is attempting tc explain
by usino the procedural rules of science. Thus ran lives among
his fellow men in the inter-subjective world of daily life, and
all our interpretation of the world is based on a "stock of
knowledge at hand" which has been more or less handed down to us.
In the natural attitude of our daily life our mind is constantly
selecting objects against a field of pre-experienced other
objects. Therefore at any moment of our life we are in a
biooraohically determined situation:
. . . there is a selection of things and aspects of
things relevant to me at any given moment whereas
other things and other aspects are for the time being
of no concern to me or even out of view. All this is
biographically determined, that is, the acter's actual
situation has its history; it is the sedimentation of
all his previous subjective experiences.69
This biographically determined situation includes possibilities of
future practical activities which often determine our "purpose at
hand." Our knowledge is socially derived and transmitted in the
vocabulary and syntax of everyday language. As Schutz puts it.
"languaoe is not a substratum of philosophical grammatical
69Alfred Schutz, "Choosing Among Projects of Action,'
Philoscohy and Phenorencicoical Research, XII (Cecember, 1951),
p. 169.
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considerations for me, but a means to express my intentions or
to understand tne intentions of others, etc."7°
The social world of the actor is arranged, with the me
as center, into associates (Umweit: the immediate world within
which direct and relatively intimate experience of others is
possible); contemporaries (Mitwelt: a world of mediate, but
contemporary, e;:perience within which indirect and relatively
anonymous experience of others can be obtained); predecessors
(Vorwelt: experiences of the historical past); and successors
(Fclgewelt: the future, of which no exeerience is possible, but
towards which an orientation may exist).71 All this is done in
various degrees of familiarity and strangeness.
72
These fields
(Zentren) of differing relevances are in turn divided into systems
of imposed and intrinsic relevances; with intrinsic relevances we
choose what we are interested in, but this interest, once
established, determines the system of relevances intrinsic to
the chosen interest.
731.
Common-sense thinking, however, overcomes the differences
in individual perspectives by way of two basic idealizations:
Alfred Schutz, "Phenomenolocy and the Social Sciences,"
in Kockelmans, Phenomenolocy, p. 466.
71  Schutz, "Phenomenolooy and the Social Sciences," p. 467.
This portion of Schutz's work has been reprinted as "The
Dirensions of the Social World," in Collected Papers Il (The vague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 20-62.
72
See Alfred Schutz, "The Hemecc-,?r" and "The Stranger," in
Collected Pacers II for applied examples of these concepts.
734Alfred Schutz, "The Well-:nforred Citizen," Social
Research, 13 (3ecemPer, 1946), pp. 463-478.
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the idealization of the interchangeability of standpoints, and
the idealization of the congruency of systems of relevance.
Together these postulates constitute the general thesis of
reciprocal perspectives--typifying constructs of thought which
supercede the thought objects of my and my felluen':: private
experiences.
74
Most knowledge does not originate from personal
experience but is socially derived, i.e., it is intersubjective.
Furthermore, knowledge has degrees of clarity, distinctness, and
familiarity and precision. Here is the difference between the
expert, the well-informed citizen, and the mah on the street.
The expert, for example, proceeds from the assumption that the
system of problems established within his field is relevant, and
that this is the cnly relevant system; whereas the well-informed
citizen is in a position where there is an infinite number of
possible frames of reference. Therefore, the frame of reference
chosen is the one defined by choosing his interest, and the well-
informed citizen is more subject to chare in what makes his
primary relevances than the expert.75 For this reason, to Schutz
the sociology of knowledce should be more concerned with the
social distribution of knowledge:
Knowledge is socially dis4ributed and the mechanism of
this distribution can be m,de the subject matter of a
sociological discipline. Tr.le, we have a so-called
sociology of knowledce. Yet, with very few exceptions,
the discipline thus misnamed has approached the problem
of the social distribution of knowledge merely from the
74r "efAutz, CO-77 -Sense ah.i Scientific Interpretation
of lit.r%an Action," p. 8.
75Scht..tz, "The Weil-Informed Citizen," pp. 474-475.
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angle of the ideological foundation of truth in its
dependence upon social, and esoocially economic,
conditions, or from that of the social implications
of education, or that of the social role of the man
of knowledge. Not sociologists, but economists and
philosophers have studied some of the many theoretical
aspects of the problem./6
The purpose of the study of the social distribution of knowledge
is to investigate
some parts of the
subject others to
order-to motives"
what motives prompt men to accept unquestionngly
relatively natural cvncept of the world and to
question. These motives can either be "in-
or "because-motives." The former refers to
the actor "prephantisizing" a future state of affairs as motive
for carrying out the action. Thus we can say the motive of the
murderer was to obtain the money of his victim. On the other
hand, we may say that the murderer has been motivated to commit
his deed because he grew up in this and that environment. This
class of motives are the "(genuine) because-motives .77
This part of Schutz's social philosophy is largely derived
from Husserl. However, he now brings in the "subjective interpre-
tation of meaning" postulate of Max Weber as a principle of
constructing course-of-action types in common-sense experiences,
which is made possible by revealing the motives which determine
a given course of action. The problem with the scientific observer
is that often his stock of knowledge differs from those befog
observed in their systems of relevances; and thus the general
761bid., p. 235.
77
Schut:, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of
Human Action," rp. 16-17.
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thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives is not sufficient to
eliminate this difficulty. The rational definition of the
scientific observer must take into account both his frame of
reference and that of the group under observation. The scientist
rust define himself as a disinterested observer, whose frame of
reference "constitutes his 'being in a scientific situation'
which supercedes his biographical situation as a human being
within the world."73 In other words the scientist is operating
under a different system of relevances, defined by the corpus of
his science and the rules of procedure central to it; but he mst
at the same time interpret human interaction patterns in terms
of their subjective meaning structure. The question is, then,
how is it possible to grasp subjective meaning scientifically?
Or, stated another way, how is it possible to grasp by a system
of objective knowledge subjective meaning structures? This is
where Schutz criticizes logical positivism:
All forms of naturalism and logical empiricism simply
take for granted this social reality, which is the
proper object of the social sciences. Inter-
subjectivity, interaction, intercommunication, and
language are simply presupposed as the unclarified
foundation of these theories. They assume, as it
were, that the social scientist has already solved
his fundamental problem, before scientific inquiry
starts./9
Eut he is not rejecting the methodology of logical positivism:
ARIbid., p. 29.
79Alfred Schutz. "Concept and Theory Formation in theSocial Sciences," in urice Natoison, ed., Fhilcsc*/ of theSocial Sciences (New York: Random HcJse, 1r2;7371, 7T.-2316.
43
I agree . . . that all empirical ;:nowledge involvesdiscovery through processes of controlled inference,
and that it must be statable in propositional form andcapable of being verified by anyone who is prepared tomake the effort to do so through observation . . . that'theory means in all empirical sciences the explicit
formulation of determinate - relations between a set ofvariables in term of which a fairly extensive class of
empirically ascertainable regularities can be explained.'-'°
Schutz is in effect synthesizing what have long been
thought to be two contradicting orientations in social science.
However, the scientist cannot be arbitrary in his creation of
constructs. They must comply with several postulates; the most
important being the postulate of logical consistency and the
postulate of adequacy. Compliance with the postulate cf logical
consistency warrants the objective validity of the thought octs
created by the social scientist; and compliance with the postulate
of adeouacy warrants their compatability with the constructs of
everyday life.87
An important part of Schutz's sociology of knowledge is
the emphasis which hi places on language. When phenomenological
philosophers such as Husserl speak of a transcendental structure
which orders experience, Schutz instead substitutes language.
which is a more empirical referent, as' the focal point of the
method of phenomenological reduction. In addition, his theoretical
work is both philosophic and sociological. In the next section we
p. 235.
81
 Schutz, "Concept and Theory Formation in the SocialSciences," pp. 246-248.
p.3.
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shall see how an American scciologist has adapted and modified
the approach of Schutz in his own sociology of knowledge.
Peter Berger
Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's The Social Construction
of Reality clearly falls within phenomenological sociolegy, yet at
the same time they have made substantive contributions which go
beyond Schutz; namely by synthesizing his ideas with those of
S2Durkheim, Weber, Marx, and George Herbert Mead. - Their definition
of the sociology of knowledge is as follows:
. . . rit] must concern itself with whatever passes
for 'knowledge' in a society, regardless of the
ultimate validity or invalidity (by whatever criteria)
of such 'knowledee'. And insofar as all human
1 knowledce' is developed, transmitted and maintained
in social situations, the scstolocy of knowledge mist
seek to understand the processes by which this
done in such a way that a 'taken-for-granted reality'
congeals for a man in the street. In other words,
we contend that the sociology of knowledge is
concerned with the analysis of the social ccrstruction
of realitv.33
They are not, therefore, concerned with epistemological questions
on a theoretical level, nor with the theoretical perspectives of
intellectuals, but with the social construction of reality on an
everyday level in an empirical fashion. Their indebtedness to
Schut7 is obOous; in fact, the first chapter of their book, "The
82
Berger and luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality.
This book has overshado.Td a similar approach by Charles Madge,
Society in t'e Mind: 1. ..-)5.nts o' the Social Eidos C;cw York:
;-ress, Isof).
83Ber;er and Luckmann, The Social Constrvction of Reality,
dr
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Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life," is entirely a
restatement of Schutz's work.
Very briefly, their view of the nature of social reality
is based on Durkheim's socioloey of religion; their dialectical
perspective from Marx; the emphasis on the construction of social
reality through subjective meanings from Weber; and the work en
the internalization of social reality from Mead.
In an earlier article co-authored by Stanley Fullberg,
Berger presents us with two conceptions of sccioiogical theery.
One sees society as a "network of human meanings." The second,
on the other hand, presents us with a view of "society conceived
of as a thing-like lacticity, standing over against its individual
members and moulding then in its socializing process.a84 These
ArP, recpprtivPly, the eociolocies of Weber and nurkheim. The
problem thus stated is how do these subjectively intended meanings
become objective facticities? The solution is that leen are
producing seciety and are in turn produced by it--here they borrow
from Marx the understanding of society as a dialectical process.
The point of convergence, in turn, between the phenomenological
and Marxian traditions is to be found in the Marxian concept of
reification; the appreension of human phenomena as if they were
thinos. This, by definition, is a dehumanized world since riaa
has lost sight of the fact that he is author of his world. The
meanirc of V-Is term beco-es clear if we understand the process
84 





by which it occurs. The first important term is that of
objectivation, the process whereby hu,Ian subjectivity embodies
in products elements of a common world; man is a world-producing
being. Objectification is the moment in the process of
objectivation in which man establishes a distance from his
producing and its product in order that he may take cognizance
of it and make of it an object of his consciousness. By
alienation is meant the process by which the unity of the
producing being and the product is broken down. Finally, by
reification is meant the moment in the process of alienation in
which the characteristic of thing-hood becomes the standard of
objective reality: reification is objectification in an
alienated mode.85
Language is the most fundamental objectivation of all,
in that it is experienced by the individual as an external
facticity--things are what they are named.86 These are common
assumptions of the social psychological approach of George Herbert
Mead. But reification operates in society most often by bestoing
ontological status on social roles and institutions. According to
Berger religious, social, and "scientific" theories are used to
legitimate and mystify the dehumanization that has occurred. All
this entails a critique of consciousness, of which, accrrding to
Berger and Pullberg, there are three levels: pre-reflectivie





presence to it; and, finally, out of the second level may arise
various theoretical formiilations of the situation.87 Bodies of
knowledge legitimate the institutional sector of society in the
sense of their being svmbolic universes, or "bodies of theoretical
tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and
encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality."88 In
addition there are various "conceptual machineries of universe-
maintenance": mythology, theolooy, philosophy and science.
Ivan H. Light has pointed out that this is nothing more than a
89restatement of the Comtean sequence.
Given the necessity for socialization of th2 individual in
society, Berger believes that identity is also a problem for the
sociology of kno/ledge.
90
 However, his most important conclusion
eiIbid., p. 204.
88Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality,p. 95. This is very siwilar to Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills intheir Character and Social 'Structure (New York: Harcourt, Braceand World, 14), pp. 274-335.
S9 Ivan H. Light, "The Soci7.1 Construction of Uncertainty,"Berkeley Journal of Sociolccv, (1969), P. 193.
gleSercer and Luckmann, The Social Construction of PealitY.pp. 173-183; also Peter Berger, "Identity as a Problem in theSociology of Knowledoe," European Journal of Sociolocv, 7 (1968),pp. 581-587. For more detaiiea analyses of contributions ofsocial psychologists to the sociology of knowledge, the readeris referred to the following articles: John C. 1cKinney, "MeContribution of George Herbert !ead to the Sociology of KnowleJlge,"Social Forces, 34 (19E5), pp. 144-149; Charles Horton Cooley."The Roots of Social Knowledge," American Journal of Socic1olyi32 (Joly, 1926), pp. 59-79 (Cooley speaks cf a "mental-so:la)complex"); Harvey A. Farberman, "Mannheim, Cooley, and Kead:Toward a Social Theory of Ventality," Soc-:ological Quz'rteriv, 11(!inter, 1970), pp. 3-1:i.
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is that "the sociology of knowledge presupposes a sociology of
language, and . . . a sociology of knowledge without a sociology
of religion is impossible (and vice versa)."91 Light thinks that
the imagery used by Berger and Luckmann is religiously inspired,
deriving from an "existential terror," and proposes instead a
socioloo,i_ of uncertainty based more on Marx, in which it is
recognized that there is creative potential in disorder, unrest,
and mass uncertainty.
92
In addition Friedrichs has noted that
where Husserl and Schutz's paradigmatic stature is essentially a
priestly one, Eerger's stands clearly in the prophetic mode in
that his sociology is based on and motivated by the paramount
claim of transcendence of the reified world in which modern man
finds himself.93 Despite these criticisms, Berger's sociology of
knowledoe is the newest approach to the sociology of knowledoe
in the last decade.
Part D: Sociology of Science Approach
It is not unusual for the sociology of science to be
conceptualized as a special case of the sociology of knowledge.
"Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality,.p. 186. See also Peter Bence). and Thomas Luckmann, "The
Sociology of Relioion and the Sociology of Knowledge," Sociology 
and Social Research, 47 (July, 1963), pp. 417-427. The problem
of language in a sociolo:y of knowledge will be found ia
Chapter III of this thesis.
Ivan ri. Light, "The Social Construction of Uncertainty,"p. 198.






However, it has been emerging as a distinct area of inquiry.
According to A. R. Hall and N. W. Storer, the sociology of science
separated from the sociokey of knowledge after the 1938 publi-
cation of Robert Merton's Science, Technology and Society in
Seventeenth CenturyEngland.
94
In this book Merton attempted to
show the connection between the development of seventeenth-century
English sciunce with a series of social and cultural factors; in
particular Puritan religious ideas and practices. However, notes
Bernard Barber:
. . . no primary causative significance was attributed to
these ideas and practices. They were shown to he
influantial for the development of science in interaction
with economic needs, cultural values, the changing secial
organization of science, population grov;th, and changing
military and naval techniques.93
After this book Merton turned his attention to the internal social
organization of science rather than with its relationship to the
rest of society. This dualism still exists in the sociology of
science, however, and we can distinguish two approaches to the
subdiscipline. For example, both Gerald DeGre and Bernard Barber,
two major contributors to the field, view the sociology of science
both as a special case of the sociology of knowledge and as the
94A. R. Hall, "Merton Revisited," History of Science, 2
(1963), pp. 1-16; N. W. Storer, The Social System of Science 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965rp. 6.
95
Bernard Larber, "Soci3iogy of Kncedledct: and Science,
1945-55," in Sociolecv in the United States or America, Ed. by
Hans Lettcrbuii—Tt::LECO: l95), 63.
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study of science as a social organization or institution.96
DeGre defines the sociology of science as follows:
A sociology cf science studies he functional inter-dependence of the sciences with the other aspects ofman's larger culture, and at the same time the internalstructure and dnamics of science as a tertiary
institution, including its norms, orgApization,
personnel, and status within society.''
Similarily, in Science and the Social Order, Bernard Barber
studies the social organization of science but adds in a later
article that "the ambiguity about.the nature of the relations
between science and society remains one of the central problems
"98in the sociology of science. Drawing on Talcott Parsons'
discussion of the generalized function of idea-systems in social
systems,99 Barber now views science as an idea-system about
empirical phenomena which is a relatively independent variable
in interaction with a series of other relatively independent scial
and personality variables; including ideologies, value-systems,
economic systems, etc.100
"Gerald De0re, Science as a Social Institution (New York:Doubleday and Company, 1-9-55); Bernard Barber, Science and theSccial Order (New York: Collier Books, 1952).
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DeGre, Science as a Social Institution, p. 3.
98
Bernard Barber, "Sociology of Science, A Trend Reportand Bibliography," Current Sociology, 5 (1956), p. 93.
99
Talcott Parsons, "The Institutionalization of ScientificInvestication," in The Social System, po. 325-348. AlthoughParsons is a major figure in the conceptual development of thesociology of science, he is passed over lichtly here as his workwas examined in Chapter III of this thesis.
100
Barber, "Sociology of Science, A Trend Report andPielicgraphy," p. 93.
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More recently N. W. Storer in his The Social System of
Science reflects the influence of Talcott Parsons; however, the
book is mostly oriented to a discussion of the norms of science
which were originally formulated by Merton: universalism,
ln,organized skepticism, communalism, and disinteredness.-- It is
interesting to interject here, that although not referring to the
sociology of science, Thelma Z. Lavine arrived at a similar
definition of the sociology of knowledge:
The sociology of knowledge is concerned to subject to
socio-historic analysis the several types of ncrms
which are operative in the construction of objectively
valid knowledge; the reculetive, or directional norm,
which establishes basic catecorial distinctions; the
validity-norm, which legislates the criteria of
concrete types of phenomena and the requirelTents
involved in their verification; the procedural norm,
which establishes for certain modes of inquiry gererel
methods of identification, measurement, eorrctoration,
etc.; the nresent?itinnal ric-m, which provides fer the
apprehension as a meaningful structure of that which
is experienced; the objectivity-norm, which legislates
for all the special sciences the general principles of
the precise discrimination of the object of interest.102
One additional book stands as a landmark in the development
of the sociology of science. This is Florian Znaniecki's The
Social Pole of the Man of Knowledge, which studies the composition
and social structure of the various types of scientists' social
roles. These roles are the technological advisers, sages,
scholars, and creators of knowledge (explorers). Znaniecki
101  Storer, The Social System of Science, chapters five andsix; Robert K. Merton, "Science and the Social Order" and
"Science and Democratic Social Structure," in Social Theory andSocial Structure, pp. 591-615.
102Thelra Z. Lavine, "Sociological Analysis of CognitiveNorms," The Journal of Philosophy, 34 (1S242), p.
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sees four interacting components of the social system in which the
man of knowledge operates: the social circle, the actor's self,
the actor's social status, and the actor's social functions.
103
It appears then that the sociology of science is
successfully breaking away from the sociology of knowledge, and
strictly speaking, is not now a true part of the latter. The
separation, however, is not complete. In fact, a resurgence of a
sociology of science in the old sociology of knowledge vein is
evident, beginning in 1962 with the publication of Thomas Kuhn's
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.104 Though speaking
largely of the natural and physical sciences, Kuhn's insights have
been taken to apply to the social sciences as well. Essentially
he sees the development of science as a political process and
not as an indenpndr--nt inctitkItion in t conco that,
sociology, Talcctt Parsons would view it. Kuhn distinguishes
between "normal science," in whico a paradigmatic base
consolidates the member of the discipline into a structure so
that cumulative research can take place. However, these
professionals become so integrated into the paradigm that with
social and political changes inconsistencies arise which they
cannot explain. rev, initiates to the discipline are more likely
to be aware of these changes and begin to break away from the
cumulative routine of "normal science"--this is a period of
103Florian Znaniecki, The Social Role of the an ofKnowledoe (New York: Columbia University—i'ress, )79-4-0j7
104Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of scientific Revolutions(Chicago: The University of Chicago t-ress, lE=.52).
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"extraordinary science." A new alternative .paradigm is created,
and after much conflict a "revolution" takes place when this new
paradigm takes the place of the old one.
Taking Kuhn's thesis, Robert W. Friedrichs has most
thoroughly delved into a new subdiscipline, the sociology of
sociology—which he considers an outgrowth of the sociology of
knowledge and sociology of science.105 Friedrichs explores the
functionalist and systems paradigm as "normal sociology" and
examines in detail the gradual shift to a search for new
paradigms—Marxian conflict theory and phenomenological sociology
being the two primary examples of "revolutionary sociology."
These, in order, are the "priestly and "prophetic" modes of
sociology. Friedrichs links these developments to social and
political changes within American society.
A more in-depth, substantive study which fits very well
into the framework Kuhn and Friedrichs propose is Alvin Gouldner's
The Coming Crisis in Western Socioloey.106 Gouldner describes two
approaches to explanation in sociology—Academic Sociology, or,
more specifically, Parsonian sociology; and Marxism. He
105Robert W. Friedrichs, A Sociolccv of Sociology.Recently two readers have appeared v.hich may be of aid to thereader. These are (1) Larry T. Reynolds and Janice M. Reynolds,The Sociolev ef Socioljriv (New York: David McKay, 1'373); andM Edward A. Tiryakian, ed., The Phenomenon of Socicloay.(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. 197:77— The subdivisions ofthe latter book are instructive: "Sociolocy and its Social
Settings," "Sociology: Values and Ideology," and "Internal
Structures of Sociolocy"; respectively, the history of sccialthouoht, the study of io!ogy, and the sociology of scienceapplied to scciology.
106
1'lvin Gouldner, The Crin2 Crisis in Western Sociolocy.(:;ew York: Basic Books, 1971).
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11
specifically states that the book is a study, in the sociology
sociology,
107 
although it lacks the conceptual development of
Friedrichs' book. Rather, it seems as if it is a history of
contemporary social thought. Some of Gouldner's more origina1
contributions might be his concepts of background and domain
assumptions. The former are in effect general orientations which
may make a theory appear intuitively convincing to the viewer;108
domain assumptions are more specific. For example .they may be
"dispositions to believe that men are rational or irrational,
that society is precarious or fundamentally stable."109 In other
words social scientists hold a subtheoretical set of beliefs
which is fused into his work. To Gouldner this is the
"infrastructure of theory and is its ultimate determinant.110
As he states:
If every theory is thus a tacit theory of politics,
every theory is also a personal theory, inevitaly
expressing, coping, and infused with the personal
experiences of the individuals wno author it.111
To Gouldner every theory in effect ideologizes social reality.
Essentially he is returning to the orthodox Marxian and Mannheimian
tradition of the sociology of knowledge perspective by pointing
107Ibid., p. 25.
108Ibid., p. 30. This is little different from Merton'sdescription of general sociological orientations, "The Bearing ofSociological Theory on Empirical Research," in Social Theory andSocial Structure, pp. 141-143.
1091bid., p. 31.
110Ibid., p. L6.
111 Ibid., p. 40.
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out how every theory is an ideological masking over or an
expression of the class structure cf society. This is "orthodox"
because, as we have seen, both Marx and Mannheim did attempt to
avoid this "det,Lnking" tendency in favor of scientific analysis.
Nowhere does Gouldner offer us a definition of what a "theory"
micht be, for this we must evidently wait.
In Chapter IV an alternative approach to this aroumentum 
ad hominen view of sociological theory and knowledge will be
outlined which avoids Gouldner's anachronistic ideologizing. In
the next section, the few existing empirical studies in the
sociology of knowledge are reviewed which may help in such a
task.
Part E: Contemporary Empirical Studies
In this section three empirical-theoretical studies are
reviewed, those of Wolff, Merton, and Horowitz. Judith Willer's
study is excluded here ts it is used in detail in Chapter IV.
Two empirical-descriptive articles, in the sense of their having
precise hypotheses which are tested, are also looked at; these
are authored by Adler and Wanderer. Many articles have bees
written on mass co717unications, political ideologies, coTmunity
power, etc., under the auspices of the sociology of knowledve, but
these are e):cluded by definition from being part of the sociology
of knowledge in this thesis. This leaves only a paucity of
studies which can even be remotely called empirical. It must be




in this thesis as merely the social determination of ideas. Mary
empirical studies, considered by their authors to be within the
sociolocy of knowledge, have attempted to show a correspondence
between ideologies with social structure. In this respect, we
look at one such effort which is representative of this older
approach which provides at least some minute justification for
rejecting the traditional definition of the sociology of knowledge.
The article in mind is Gwynne Nettler's "A Test for the Sociology
of Knowledge."112
Nettler analyzed public opinion data to find if political
attitudes were determined by membership in certain occupations.
The persons questioned were all professionals with established
reputations in their fields. Nettler concluded that "there is no
simple position that conditions all knowledge.u113 It was found
instead that the relationship between social position and knowledge
was a function of the criterion of social position used, the type
of knowledge measured, and the tire at which the relationship is
measured. This study was at best misnamed, for it tells us only
that certain professionals may or may not hold a particular
political opinion at any given time. This article foreshadowed
tne reduction of the sociology of knowledge to mass communications
research and political sociology.
112Gwynne Nettler, "A Test for the Sociology of Knowled9e,"
American Sociciccical Review, 10 (1945), pp. 393-9.
1131bid., p.
 39.
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Insofar as the author can detenrine, only two articles
may properly be called empirical-descriptive research in the
sociology of knowledge. In the earliest of the two, Franz Adler
relates types of epistemological thinking to social and cultural
change, individual freedom of action, and general security. 114
Four types of epistea:ological thinking were used--universalism,
nominalism, organismic (or intuitional), and dialectical. An
attempt was made to measure the degree to which the thought of
any given thinker--in this case a panel of philosophers and
sociologists—corresponded to each of the four types of
epistemological thinking. An initial finding indicated no
discernible relationship between the chosen characteristics of
historical periods and orcanismic-intuitional and dialectical
thinking. Secondly, scatter diagrams shoed that the use of
types of thought as independent variables led to better fitted
curves than the use of characteristics of historical periods.
This suggests that the definition of the sociology of kno.11edge
as the social determination of thought is not entirely accurate.
The main findings are summed below:
(1) Speed of change is inversely related to universalist
thought content. A sli7ht positive relationship exists
betvieen nominalism and speed of change.
(2) Increased speed of chance is negatively related to
universalism, but positively related to nominalism.
(3) Universalism and increased security are positively
related; universalism and decreased security neoative/y
related.
114Franz Adler, "A Ouantitative StuOy in the Sociolcqy of




Relationships between nominalism and the other variables were
primarily curvilinear.
Adler's article is important for its Empirical precision
and for the fact that the correlations found did not predict
any clear causal direction of the influence of change on
epistemological thinking, or vice versa.
Jules J. Wanderer makes a departure from traditional
sociology of knowledge in the second empirical-descriptive
study.
115
Instead of focusing on substantive properties of a
mode of thought and then relating it to a social base, he
analyzes intellectual systems for underlying structural
dimensions. Using Guttman scale analysis Wanderer uncovers a
common structural property in the thought of Spinoza and Euclid,
two thinkers separat by centuries and distinguished by their
work in diverse subject matters. In Wanderer's words:
If a common underlying dimension can be empirically
ascertained among intellectual systems with content
as different as Spinoza's and Euclid's, and if th2se
intellectual systems can be said to be representative
of a tradition of thought, i.e., Western thought,
then one might include the constituent structural
properties of the traditions that issued them.11°
Wanderer found that both Spinoza and Euclid "present unidimensional
and cumulative arguments in the demonstration of their
propositional systems."
11? 
It was discovered that the structural
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Ju1es J. Wanderer, "An Empirical Study in the Sociology




element of Western rationality underlaid the intellectual work
of both thinkers: both employed lineal demonstrations of proof.
Wanderer suggests that these structural components of thought
could be examined in light of their social origins as traditionalcomparative sociology of knowledge has done. For this thesis,
the important thing is that Wanderer has demonstrated how thoughtitself may be structured; this is utilized in the author's
definition of the sociology of knowledge.
The first of the empirical-theoretical articles is by
Kurt Wolff.118 Wolff believes that the sociology of knowledge
has anachronistically limited its subject matter to ideologies,
theories, and ideas. To him. the sociology of knowledge is
concerned with two m3in elements: communicated mental events,
and the relations existing between these events And social
A "mental event" is a general term referring to all e7otional-
intellectual processes, ranging from intuitive feelings to the
creation of philosophical systems. Wolff says:
If . . . the sociolo7y of knowledce lirits itsinvestigations to manifestations of knowiedge--as themental presence of contents of the consciousness, oras contents of the consciousness to which the qu?.lifi-cation of "I know" can be attached--it excludes, fromthe beginning, thinking and feelin9.119
As Wanderer did, Wolff is attempting to make the scciolou of
knowledge something more than just the content and substance of
knowledge; they are coing further into consciousness itself.
118
Kurt H. Wolff, "The Sociolony of Knowledge: Frp!-,asi:s os










According to Wolff, the method of the sociology of
knowledge is that of understandine; the most important concept
pertaining to this methodology is the "central attitude," or
that attitude "which through our continuous efforts in the process
of understanding a given communicated mental event reveals itself
as one which renders understandable all single attitudes."
120
Wolff refines this concept by referring to "typical central
attitudes," ferried by reducing an empirically traceable attitude
to a defined type. These typical attitudes are autonoTous in so
far as they are understood according to their own structure.
121
Furthermore, there are theoretical attitudes which are oriented
toward the solution of a mental task; the most distinguishable of
these are the magical, religious, artistic, philosophicel, and
scientific. This is similar to theoretical model in Chapter D.V
of this thesis.
The second major empirical-theoretical study is !,,erten's
paradigm for the sociology of knowledge.122 This is substantially
a structural-functional approach concerned with the existential
basis of mental productions. The most original part of his
paradigm is on the ambiguity of terns used to designate the
relations between the social base and mental productions:
a. causal or functional relations: determination,
cause, correspondence, necessary condition, conditioning,
1201bid., p. 112.
121Ibid., p. 115.
122Robert K. Merton, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in
Sccial Theory erd Social Structure, pp. 510-542.
itS"
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functional interdependence, interaction, dependence,
etc.
b. symbolic or orcanismic or meaningful relations:
consistency, herrony, coherence, unity, congruence,
compatibility, (and antonyms); expression, realization,
symbolic expression, Strukturzussamenhang, structural
identities, inner connection, styistic analogies,
logicq- meaningful integration, identity of meanings,
etc."
This is perhaps the core problem in the sociology of knowledge,
and the basis of distinctions between various approaches to its
study. It is largely a question of methodology, which will be
looked at in Chapter III of this thesis. Interestingly enough,
Merton does not mention dialectical relationships in his paradigm.
The final empirical-theoretical study by Irving Louis
Horowitz is in fact concerned with the basic elements of
ideological systems, related to mass communications and public
opinion. However, there are important innovations made in that.
(1) Horowitz suggests that a logical indexing of basic variables
in the study of ideas as a,cluster type be carried out; and
(2) he links the Parson4an pattern-variables to the study of
constellations of thought; albzit in this case political
ideological systems. The author agrees with Horowitz's conclusion
that we must:
. . . explain what the sociology of knowledce can
perform operationally; namely, the production of
empirical studies in the sociology of knowledge base4
on some firm logical distinctions and minus the awkward
basgaoe of obscure phraseology and inherited rttaphysical
credos that identify lo9ical truths with historical
events. The history of the sociology of kncwledge has
12315w p. 515.
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been a proorqssive emancipation from its metaphysical
inheritance.
Summary and Conclusions
In this rather lengthy review of the literature, the ideas
in a number of divergent approaches to the sociology of knowledge
have been descrfted. The differences in these approaches is quite
apparent, but rather than focusing on this aspect an attempt will
be made instead to isolate some common themes which will help in
arriving at some basic conceptual components cf the sociology of
knowledge and its fundamental problems. With this accomplished,
it will be easier to criticize existing definitions conceptualizing
the field and to offer a definition which might be more precise.
(A) A central premise of this thesis is that the stud)
of ideology is not properly the study of knowledge; more often
than not this leads to a "debunking" of social theory of the type
we have seen of Alvin Gouldner, and perhaps in the polemical
writings of riarx. Horowitz placed the study of ideology within
the realm of the sociology of knowledge but did so on an empirical
basis. Of the three structuralists, Durkheim avoided mention of
ideologies altogether. Mannheim tried to escape a simple theory
of ideology with his conception of Aspekstrukur, but became so
overvhelmed in his epistemological questions as to lose logica
coherence. He did try to escape the bounds of ideological thintin,
by speaking of the role of a free-floating intelligentsia, but
124Irving Louis HorcAtz, "A Formalization of t Socislogy
Knovlede," Behaviorial Science, 9 (Janory, 1964), pp. 45-Si.
63
this ac-eally violated his basic premises and he never transcended
the dilernas he created. Parsons was concerned with ideolo2ies,
but only to the extent that they conflict with empirical
conceptions of social systems. Sorokin did not use the concept
of ideology, although his cultural mentality types present us
with an analogous problem on a broader basis; to this he sought
a solution in his integralist conception of truth. Of the
phenomenologists, the sociology of knowledge of Schutz had no
mention of ideology, and Berger came closest when he spoke of
symbolic universes; although these were not depicted as completely
controlling perspectives. Stark was quite explicit in rejecting
the study of ideologies as being within the bounds of the
sociology of knowledge; and Scheler wrote only e propen:ieies
to class prejudices; knowledge, on the other hand, was the
objective perception of reality. Due to our definition, no
empirical-descriptive studies were concerned with ideologies.
(B) The sociolbgy of knowledge, like many other
subdisciplines, can be examined on the micro- and macrq-
socillogical planes; the former more involved with thought
systems as such; the latter with their place in the larger
context of society. This thesis falls more under the micro-
sociology of knowledge. These distinctions were made only by
Werner Stark and Pitirim A. Sorokin.
(6) In this review of the sociology of knowledge, the
dialectical nature of many relationships is arent. This
occurs on several levels: (1) the dialectical relationship
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between social determinism and free will of men (%.:hich influences
their thought structures); and (2) the dialectical relationship
betv.een ideas as superstructural phenomena and the empirical, or
material substratum of society. The first was central to the
thought of Marx, although to him as well as to Durkheim, social
relationships and social consciousness mediated this dialectic
on both levels. However, both Durkheim and Mannheim were more
deterTainstic in their explanation of the structural influences on
thought. Parsons and Sorokin tended to be deterministic on the
opposite end of the spectrum, that which is commonly termed the
ideational or superstructural level. Scheler tried to transcend
this problem by postulating a dualistic metaphysics and with his
discussion of the "positive factor of realization." His work did
not reach the sophistication of Marx hov:ever. Stark saw a
reciprocal relationship working between the substructure and
superstructure, and defined social determination in terrs of a
dialectical process of social interaction. A rudimentary dialectic
is working in Schutz's distinction between "in-order-to" and
'because motives"; phenomenology in general though is an active
theory of knowledge and the problem does not loom so lar9e.
Peter Berger was definite in his adoption of Marxian dialectics.
Finally, it is to be recalled that Franz Adler simply views
dialectic thinking as one of four types of epistemological
thinking.
(D) The prob;em of the relations between ideas and social





in the sociology of knowledge. Only Merton treated this problem
systematically; on the basis of this thesis, however, the author
believes the relationship to be dialectical. This is an option
which Merton did not even mention.
(E) Logically following this emphasis on dialectical
thinking, we can see the attempt of many of these thinkers to
synthesize rationalism and empiricism in their work; or, with
Schutz, logical positivism with subjectivism. Uith Marx, the
synthesis of rationalism and empiricism is evident in his
methodology. Durkheim believed his
conception cf collective representations to be a solution to
the two opposing systems of knowledge of Kantian a priori sm and
classical empiricism. Karl Mannheim began to establish himself
as an empiricist and in his struonle to find a criterion by
which to distinguish values approached a solution to the problem.
Mannheim arrived at a somewhat shaky synthesis of historicism
and positivism. In his ,integralist conception of truth, Sorokin
believed he had brought together empiricism and rationalism',
Parsons clings to his belief that empirical-rational knowledge is
an independent aspect of all cultural systems. In his dualistic
metaphysics Scheler thought he had synthesized idealism and
materialism. Stark and Schutz avoided this problem altogether by
conceptualizing it on a different level; i.e., the level of
sutejective versus objective conceptions of reality. Peter





(F) Of the phenorenologists, Schutz and Stark, and to
some extent Scheler, used a methodology of phenomenological
reductionism which has immense possibilities in social science,
especially if t:edded to the dialectic method. Scheler's
phenomenology is essentially religiously motivated ("the
cognitive act as insight into eternal essences"), as is Stark's
to the point where he is searching for an ultimate philosophical-
religious truth cr absolute. However, there is an objective
element in Stark's methodology--the search for the common factor
in the relative; which strictly speaking is analogous to an
empirical-dialectical methodology. Schutz develops the method
most explicitly in his various postulates which the social
scientist must observe in the creation of constructs and in
the social scientist's treatment of a subject under study as a
"homunculus."
(G) Within the writings of almost all of the thinkers
reviewed, there is a move away from a radical relativism that
has been traditionally ascribed to the sociology of knowledge.
Mannheim and Sorokin are perhaps the most bound to this
hermenuetic circle; although both try to avoid this, their
solutions have been severely criticized.
(H) The importance of language to a sociology of
knowledge is evident in the work of Marx, Schutz, and Berger.
This will be taken up aoain in Chapter III.
(1) The sociology of science and the sociology of
sociology are treated as independent disciplincs; where they
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overlap into traditional sociology of knowledge this is usually
in the structural or cultural approach.
(J) Th.2 question of consciousness itself as object of
study in the sociology of knowledge is rooted in the work of
Marx; and to a limited degree with Durkheim; and very much so in
the work of Sch'itz, Berger, and Wolff. Other thinkers took ideas
in some form as datum Sorokin could not free his mentality types
from culture and Scheler placed ideas in a supratemporal Platonic
realm; Stark conceived of an axiological layer of the mind
(which is consciousness). This is examined in greater detail for
each of the contributors as it is a necessary prelude to a
definition of the sociology of knowledge:
MARX: Consciousness is essentially a social product
created, however, in a dialectic between individual a4..1
society which is often associated with a certain rode
of production in society. Bece of his empircism,
Marx could explicate a conception of false consciousness
which in more general terms characterized the process
of reification; here general consciousness exists as en
abstraction ovex the individual, obfuscating the true.
living, communal consciousness..
DURKHET1: States of consciousness are categorically
structured in the human mind from participation in the
collective conscience. Our basic conceptions of space
and tim are conditioned by cur social and religious •
affairs. Once established, these catecorical thought
patterns establish an autonomy of their on; as for
example, Oth scientific classificatory thought.
MANNKEP: Our thinking is inherently ideological, b4t
after reconsideration, a noological plane of thought does
exist.
SOROKIN: Mental life is inexorably tied in with cultural
systerz of truth and reality, as are our basic conception&
of causality, space, and ti.
PARSC%S: Ides ere considered in terms of their substantive
content, which is culturally defined.
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SCHELER: Forms of consciousness have a certain propensity
to be determined by social class; but the incividual can
theoretically escape this. Through eliminatiui of
prejudices the individual can, in his cognitive life,
participate in the realm of eternal truth.
STARK: Human consciousness is essentially social, and is
always related to values. There is an axiological layer
of the mind which can determine what is to be selected
from the materials of knowledge for inclusion in the
objects of knowiedge.
SCHUTZ: Through phenomenological reduction, pure states
of consciousness can be assumed. However, consciousness
is always intending something and thus the individual
exists in a system of relevances which is the sedimentation
of his previous subjective experiences.
BERGER: There are three levels of consciousness: pre-
reflective, reflective, and theoretical.
ADLER: There are basic types of epistemological thinking
to be found in men: universalism, nominalism, intuitionism,
dialectic.
WANDERER: Underlying structural dimensions of thought can
be distincmished from subcfantivP prTpertiec CT !rn nf
thought.
WOLFF: Mental events are emotional-intellectual processes;
contents of consciousness are only external manifestations.
HOROWITZ: Cluster types of ideas can be found;
constellations of thought.
(K) Finally, with reference to the bearing of the sociology
of knowledge on sociological theory, only Schutz and Gouldner make
specific connections in any detail.
This completes the summary of the review of literature.
Many of the themes and concepts are to be integrated ii the following
two chapters of the thesis. The information provided in Chapter II



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
In this chapter, building on the conclusions reached in
the preceding chapter, the author in the first part of this chapter
criticizes past conceptualizations of the sociology of knowledge
by focusing on the problem of the relationship between concepts
offered in definitions. The notion of isomorphism of knowledge
with either social structure or cultural values is rejected. In
conjuncture with this, the importance of language as a mediating
phenomenon in a definition of the sociology of knowledge is
stressed. Following this, the relationship between the sociology
of knowledge, epistee'ology and philosophy in general, the
philosophy of science, and the study of ideology is discussed.
The second part of the chapter distinguishes between the
sociological theory of knowledge and the classical theory of
knowledge. After classifying post definitions of the sociology
of knowledge as being passive, the consequence of such a definition,
which is a paralyzing relativism manifested in the dual problem
of objectivity and imputation, is examined. Intrinsic and
extrinsic approaches to the sociology of knowledge are distinguished.





and explains the terms which comprise it. The chapter concludes
with a suggestion of what the importance of the sociology of
knowledge for sociological theory might be.
For the purpose of criticism, three of the most frequently
cited definitions of the sociology of knowledge by reviewers of
the field are stated:
(A) The sociology of knowledge deals with the socio-
cultural determinants of thinking. There are tro
approaches. The first regards thoucht as relative, i.e.,
the validity of ideas is restricted to particular groups,
cultures, and historical epcchs. It also implies El
epiphenomenolism, for thought is merely the expression
of, or an accompaniment to, an underlying reality. Not
only the manner of cognition and understanding but also
the categories of thought are a functicn cf an independent
variable, sore social cr cultural factor. This approaeh
is an extreme extrinsic interpretation. The second or
"substantive" approach does not raise the question of
validity nor consider thought as merely epipheno7enal.
It does try to show a functional reletionship between a
socio-cultural context and the theoretical problems
formulated and developed.121)
(6) . . . whatever the conception of knowledge, the
orientation of this discipline remains largely the same:
it is prir„arily concerned with the relations between
knowledge and other ex'istential factors in the society or
culture.140
(C) The point of view characteristic of the sociology of
knowledge is the consideration of the mental productions
insofar as they are influenced by social factors
again the term "influence" must be taken in a very broad
sense. It connotes all the degrees of conditioning which
can exist between teo variat,les frcm simple correspondence
up to the most mechanical determinism. . . . The
sociology of knowledge, a positive science, has as its
ambition a precise description of the ways in which certain
1nOtto H. Dahlke, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in H. E.
Barnes and Fa:rard Becker. eds., Contemporary Social Theory
100 (New York: P.npleton-Century, 1940), p. 55.
40k 126r-,rton, "The Sociology of Knowledge," p. 510.
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social factors influence certain mental productions, and
to do so follows a strict method of observation.127
In all three of these definitions, it is apparent that the crux of
the problem of the sociology of knowledge is the relationship 
between mental factors and social factors. All three of these
definitions have faults, however.
The first approach of which Dahlke writes (definition A) is
synonymous with the term "structural" used in this thesis; that is,
the sociology of knowledge characteristic of Durkheim and Mannheim
and to a limited extent Marx. The second is similar to the approach
termed "cultural." All these definitions tend to emphasize the
social or cultural determination of ideas without perceiving the
feedback of mental phenomena to social and cultural patterns.
That is, few definitions take knowledoe or ideas as inependent
variables, rather than the dependent (as a realm of thought
autonomous from particular cultures), and investigate its social
consequences rather than its social origins. To speak of an
isomorphism of knowledge with either society or culture is a very
static conception of the sociology of knowledge. On a micro-
sociological level it is probable that the dialectic which Marx
describes is that which best fits the relationship between
individual systems of thought and society. The dialectic is not
defined necessarily as a principle of contradiction, but, for lack
of a better word, it refers to this process of complemontarity
and reciprocity; and in so doing supercedes the notion of causality
127Maquet, The Sociology of Kno;:ledoe, pp. 4-5, 10.
111.1 ! ••••




which has been the root of the problems in defining the relationshipbetween mental phenomena and social or cultural influences. On themacrosociological level, it is even more difficult to give a term tothese relationships as the degree of complexity is increased. But
here too the term dialectic is perhaps most apprcpriate. As
Schneider suggests, until sociologists can better array and
understand the clusters of meanings to which dialectic refers, it
is useful to retain the term.
128
The dialectical relationship
between mental phenomena and social and cultural phenomena on the
macrosociological scale is the first premise of our definition of
the sociology of knowledge.
A second important element of our definition of the
sociology of knovfledge centers around lan7;uage. To the Feint:
language provides a concrete referential phenomenon by which wemay connect the primary elements of the sociology of knowledge.
This, too, would be very static unless wedded to the notion of adialectical process as described above. Thought which is
meaningful is communicated or expressed by language or some otherform of symbolisn—this is the basic insight of George Herbert
Mead and the symbolic interactionists in sociology. To Mead themind is simply the presence in behavior of significant symbols;
language is the medium through which individuals develop "minded"
behavior. Significant symbols always imply a context within rohichthey have significance, or a universe of discourse, a system of




com:eon meanings.129 These ideas can be tied in with the
phenomenologists. For instance, Ernst Cassirer, a philosopher
whose work has long been deemed relevant to social science,
believed that:
. . . consciousness takes some given content as
signifying a universe of meaning beyond itself and
of which the content is a symbolic representation.
The various forms are the different structures of
such meaning. Consciousness functions in accordance
with these forms which are characteristic of itself.
It is "form-giving" to whatever is "given" to
In the review of the literature we have seen the importance
of language to Marx, Schutz, and Berger. But as far back as 1348
Wilhelm von Humboldt ventured to say that "man lives with the
world about him principally, indeed . . . exclusively, as language
presents it.
.131 And the famous Whorfian hypothesis claims that
'the world is presented in a kaleidoscipic flux of impressien
which has to be organized . . . largely by the linuistics systems
in our minds."132 M3n's consciousness is filled with his
experiences and his knowledge is experience which has particular
meaning for him. In order to convey these meanings he uses
language. As Hertzler says, "Thus the language-system and the
129
From John C. McKinney, "The Sociology of Knowledge of
George Herbert ;lead," pp. 146-149.
130
Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, III
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951-, pp. 56-57.
131
Quoted in Joshua Fishman, "A Systematication of the
Whorfian Hypothesis," in Edward E. Sampson, ed., Social PsYcholgix
(Englewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 28.
132B. L. Whorf, "Science and Linguistics," Technology 
Review, 44 (1940). PP. 229-231.
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socio-culture texture and context of society or even a group of
peope cannot be separated. Each reflects the other; eh is both 
cause and effect of the other. [emphasis added]"133 The stress
here is not on mass communications of the variant espoused by
Merton and Volff, but is rather structural linguistic analysis.
This is not incongruent with the movement in philosophy of placing
that discipline on a basis of linguistic analysis, such as in the
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein./34 Thus both a methodology and a
conceptualization for the field of the sociology of knowledge is
emerging here: dialectical structural linguistic analysis. This
is inexorably tied in with a critique of consciousness. Befere
suggesting a more concrete-definition of the sociology of kno;:ledge,
it is first necessary to distinguish it from some other arei,.s of
inquiry with which it has been confused.
Although the sociology of knowledge involves epistemological
questions, it is not epistemology proper. The letter is a very
general branch of philosophy concerned with the character of
knowledge--in essence, epistemology is synonymous with the classical 
theory of knowledge described further in this chapter. For the
moment, consider the rather adamant view of Virgil G. Hinshaw:
. . . there is no epistemological branch of the sociology
of knowledge. If there are consequences for the theory of
knowledge, they should be investigated by the epistemologist,
not by the sociologist, who is properly a behavior scientist.
133Joyce 0. Hertzler, "Toward a Sociology of Language,"
Social Forces, 32 (Oece7lber, 1952), p. 112.
134Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investioationi
(Ne4 York: The Macill, n CompanT—T9'cgr.----
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In other words, the sphere of competence of sociology of




agrees with Hinshaw that there are separate spheres of
of the sociologist and philosopher. But on the other
is no reason why the two cannot develop in conjuncture
with one another; the contention being that the very nature of the
sociology of knowledge deands such a union.
philosophy since Kant, including Husserl and
sought to make philosophy a science; in this
have an affinity to each other.
In traditional or classical theories of knowledge one
usually looks at the relationship between the perceiving suject and
the objective external world, showing how subjective conscicusness
structures a unified image of this mass of impressions. The
sociology of knowledge simply makes the social world of ran the
eirpirical referent of his
inherently connected with
tend to forget, with some
including sociology, have












analysis can have a definite influence on the quality of scientific
135Virgil G. Hinshaw, "Epistemological Relativism and the
Sociology of Knowledge," Philosophy of Science, 15 (January, 1948,1 
pp. 4-10.
136
See H. J. Kienzle, "Epistemology and Sociology."
British Journal cf Sociolocv, 21 (Decert,er, 1970). pp. 413-t24;
and Dorothy Emt ano Aliasoair Ma6ntyre, eds., Sociolorical
Theory and Philosophical Analysis (New York: MaCillan Ccapany,
80
sociology. In addition the methods of both disciplines are
beoinning to overlop. Irving Horowitz, who sought to establish
the sociology of knowledge on a scientific-empirical base,
himself admits that "the ultimate aim of the sociology of knowledge
corresponds to the historic quest cf philosophy. "137 Of all the
sociologists of knowledge, Berger and Pullberg were most explicit
when they noted that while the critique of consciousness has been
traditionally the province of philosophy and the empirical analysis
of the social location of knowledoe the province of sociology and
other social sciences, a more comprehensive perspective unites the
two views:
. . . the sociolocy of knowledge is not an optional
entertainment for either philosophy cr sociology.
Rather, the sociology of knowledoe presents an
essential meeting place for t*E.! sociok-:ist and the
philosopher as each is enoaped in his own proper
task, which is the illumination of tho human world.18
This is the kind of intecration of the disciplines of sociology
and philosophy which the ,author has been seeking in this thesis.
Classically, the sociolooy of knowledge has restricted
itself to, or at least been identified with, the study of ideology:
defining it in such broad terms as to make all knowledge and
thinking ideological. But looking at the following three definitions
of ideology we can see that it does refer to a narrower ptlenomenon
than knowledge:
137Irvino Louis Horowitz, "Science, Criticism, and the
Sociology of Kno:Jedge," Philosophy and Phenvoenolocical Pev'tecit,
21 (1•;60), p. 185.
138Bergor and Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociolo:jicai




"Ideology" is a generic term applied to general ideas
potent in specific situations of conduct: for exar7„)1c,
not any ideas, only political ones; not any values,
only those specifying a given set of preferences; not
any, belief, only those governing particular modes of
thought.
Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers.140
. . . ideology names the structure of situations in such
a way that the attitude contained toward them is one of
commitment. Its style is ornate, vivid, deliberatively
suggestive: by objectifying moral sentiment through the
same devices that science shuns, it seeks to motivate
action. 141
Ideology is expressed in terms of evaluative, often pejorative
language; it is not knowledge, but the distortion of knowleege
which it seeks. Geertz conceives of two approaches to the study
of ideology. Once the interest theory, based on social class, sees
ideology as the rdtionalization of self-interest. The other, the
strain thenry, stresses the cathartic, morale, solidarity, and
advocatory functions of ideology.142 He attempts to synthesize
these in a way which is directly analogous to what this thesis
is doing at the level of the sociology of knowledge. Geertz sees
a weakness in both approaches in that the link between cause of
ideology and its effects is lost as the connecting element--the
139David F. Apter, Ideology and Discontent (New York:
Free Press, 1964), p. 17.
140Daniel Sell, in James P. Young, ed., The Politics of
Affluence (San Francisco: Chandler Publisning Company), p. 201.
141Clifford Geertz, "Ideology cs a Culturil System," in




autonomous process of symbol formulation—is often passed over
in silence.
143
The "end of ideo1ogy:1 debate sparked by Bell in 1960
meant prim commitments the end of itme to political ideo1ces.
144
To some degree this has been replaced with an emphasis on
occupational ,deoloaies.
145
Regardless of whether ideology is
defined in terms of political commitments or occupdtional outlooks,
it is not a problem of the sociology of knowledge. It is better
to reserve the study of ideologies to political scientists and
political sociologists; or to students of collective behavior,
social movements, or occupations. Knowledge in this thesis is
taken to be the subjective apperception of objective reality,
which assumes that nonideological statements are possible.146
In addition, the conception of the sociology of knowledge
as the social distribution of knowledge, such as that of Schutz
and also of the structuralists, is better classified under social
stratification. This s'Ubdiscipline usually takes social status.
1960).
/42Ibid., p. 7i.
144Daniel Bell, The End of Ideoloav (New York: Free Press,
145John H. Marx, "A Multidimensional Conception of
Ideologies in Professional Arenas: The Case of the Mental Health
Field," Pacific Sociolocical Review, 12 (1969), pp. 75-E5; arild
Vernon K. Dibble, 'Occupations and Ideology," ,tmerican Jourral of
Sociology, 68 (1963), pp. 229-20.
I15See Theodor Geer, "Ieeology and Truth," in Renate
Mayntz, ed., Theodor Geicer on Socizl Order and ass Soclety 






class, or econorTic systems as independent variE,51es; this is avoided
in our dialectical definition of the sociology of knowledge.147
When writing about the sociology of knowledge and
sociological theory, it is important to distinguish between the
former and the sociological theory of knowledoe.
148
Texts in
sociological theory often include the sociology of knowledge as if
it were actually a theory, but this is not necessarily the case.
It is perhaps an elliptical distinction to make, for they seem in
some respect to presuppose one another. Yet like in so many fields,
we study a subject matter but have no true theoretical explanation
for it--i.e., we have studies in the area of political sociology,
but as of yet there is no sociological theory of pelitics. Much
of th work in sociological theory is- rather metatheoretical,
general staterents about the nature of theory construction. The
sociology of knowledge can provide insight into the social
construction of theory; and, in a rather unique way, these sar;ie
insights may be helpful in constructing theories within the
sociology of knowledge itself.
We have ,rentioned the c.:ssical theory of knowledge on a
preceding page. This theory of knowledge probably culminates in
147An exception is the social stratification approach of
Preto, who believed that social strata are not primarily
determined by economic or other extern..1 factors, but are
constellations of and the consciousness. See Bridgett verger,
"Vilfredo Pareto's Sociology of Knowledge," Social Research, 34
(Summer, 1967), p. 280.
14
Gera1d DeGre, "The Sociolosy cf Knowledoe and the




the work of Immanuel Kant, whose conception detaches the knowing
subject from his social context. Karl Popper has pointed ct
that this is an "active" theory c knowledge in contrast to the
"passive" perspective of the sociology of knowledge. Pepper
calls the sociology of knowledge the "receptacle theory of the
mind," or, more bluntly, the "bucket theory of the mind."149 He
is criticizing the approaches which this author has termed the
structural and cultural. The dialectical conception of the
sociology of knowledge synthesizes the activist and passivist
distinction of Popper. Man is creating knowledge and at the
sare time created by existing bodies of thought. It is t:-ie
passivist approach which has been the source of the entire
problem of objectivity and relativism that formed the basis of
almost all the critiques of Karl Mannheim in particular. This is
the baffling logical contradiction illustrated by the riddle
.“150which goes, "Epimenides, who is a Cretan, says 'All Cretans lie'
Thus if Epimenides speaks the truth, then at least one Cretan
tells the truth and the proposition is self-contradicting, or
false. In more archaic terrinology, this is the problem of
"imputation" which we find so effectively criticized by Wolff,
1"Karl Popper, "The Sociology of Knowledge," in The 0;en,
Socie.ty. and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton University es4.1963), pp. 213-214.
15 °Benjamin Waltcrs, The Sociology of Knowledce
Problem oi Objectivity," in L. Gross, ed., Scciolocicai 7*ory:,
Inquiries and Paradicms, (Net; York: EarpPr and Row, 1St)).
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Child, and Gruenwa1d.151 On a different level, the activist-
passivist dichotomy is synonymous to the intrinsic-extrinsic
distinction made by many reviewers of the sociology o knowledge.
152
In the "intrinsic" approach one is primarily concerned with
thought in terms of its inherent meaning and logical interrelations;
where the latter is more concerned with the social context of
thought. This too is supereeded by our dialectical approach.
The most direct connection of the sociology of knowledge
with sociological theory is made by Kurt H. Wolff, who claims that
in his article he has dealt primarily with the relationship between
the two disciplines.153 Yet very little of the paper is actually
oriented in this direction, and all Wolff concludes is that the
sociology of knowledge makes it incumbent on sociological theory
to define itself. However, the author contends that sociolegi,a1
theory is relatively well-defined, and that the sociology of
knowledge perspective is most relevant in that it may help us
understand the cognitive framework of those who construct
151Wolff, "The Sociology of Knowledge: Emphasis on an
Empirical Attitude"; Arthur Child, "The Problem of Imputation in
the Sociolog of Knowledge"; and for Gruenwald, see Kurt H.
Wolff, "Ernst Gruenwald and the Sociology of Knowledge: A
Collective Venture in Interpretation," History of the Behavioria1 
Sciences, I (April, 1965), pp. 152-164.
152See Wolff, "Ernst Gruenwald and the Sociology of
Knowledge"; Stark, The Sociology of Knowledge, p. 213; Fuse,
"Sociology of Knowledge Revisited: Some Pemaining Problems and
Prospects," p. 212.
153Kurt 1!. Wolff, "The Sociology of Knoleege and
Sociologic,J1 Theory," in Llewellyn Gross, ed., Evr-To51 OA
Sociological Theory (Evanston and Ne4 York: Row, ieterson and
Company, 1959E- pp. 567-602.
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sociological theories, avoiding the reduction of theory to
ideology; the one-sided attempts to make knowledge isomorphic with
social structure or cultural values; and the self-defeating
arguments over imputation or objectivity.
Another study connecting the two disciplines only says that
the "sociology of knowledge is of great value to historical
sociology or the history of sociological theory."
154 
This is only
true if one clings to the traditional, structural definition of
the sociology of knowledge. In the next chapter, a limited example
of a different connection between the two disciplines is outlined.
All this is contingent upon a definition of the sociology of
knowledge, to which we finally turn.
The follcing definition of the sociology of knowledge has
alreadv been sugoested throughout this thesis. It is notintanAe4
as being final or complete, but hopefully overcomes some of the
limitations of past definitions;
The sociology o-r knowledge is a L:nique intersectionof sociology and philosophy having as its subjectmatter the study of the modal structure and contentof consciousness in its dialectical interconnectionwith social and cultural systems cf relevance, mani-fested as systems of knowledge. Language is themediating phenomenon by which this relationship ofelements is concretized; thus the methodology ofsociology of knowledge is one of dialectical.structural linguistic analysis.
The earlier part of this chapter examined the treatment of the
sociology of knowledge as the intersection of sociol:.gy and
philosophy; as well as the dialectical and linguistic aspectg
154Fuse, "Sociology of Knowledge Pevisited," p. 258.
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involved in a definition of the field. "Systems of relevance"
is ued in the sense of Alfred Schutz, which avoids a narrow
sociologistic (orthodox Marxian) or culturalogistic (Sorokin)
conceptualization of social and cultural systems. "Knowledge"
has been defined by contrastinc it with ideological thinking.
Some explication of the phrase "modal structure and content of
consciousness" is still due though.
'Consciousness" was a primary object of study to Peter
Berger and Alfred Schutz in particular; all the references to
consciousness are summed in Chapter II. In general, consciousness
is distinguishable only by the act of consciousness and the
content of consciousness; 'otherwise a definition is almost
impossible. This perhaps violates one of the rules of definition
by defining e phenemenen in terms of itself, but the very nature
of consciousness precludes any other method of definition.
Consciousness is at once personal and social; thus it is a
dialectical stream of an inter-subjective process which has the
characteristic of intentionality; that is, it is selective in its
experiences. This selectivity is analocous to what Werner Stark
called the axiological layer of the mind. Speaking about Parete.
Bridgett Berger says that "it is appropriate to speak of
constellations of consciousness, understood as being in an on
going dialectic relation with social conduct."155 William James
noted that consciousness is the result of self-assertion end
155




self-negation; that this is a dialectical process.156 His
distinction is similar to that of Mead's on the "I" and the "Me."
Self-assertion is the "I"; self-negation to James is the world, or
"not-I." This en;-,e.shes perfectly with the conception of the
sociology of kno.dledoe ahich we have attempted to describe. The
activity_ of this consciousness is concretized in language.
Finally, the definition is concerned with "modal types of
consciousness." Obviously we cannot say that one or another form
of consciousness is exclusive of all others; we can only speak of
a manifestional form of an underlying property. The following
chapter presents four modal forms of consciousness from which
specific types of sociological theory may emerge. As most of the
work of this nature has been concerned with the cultural and social
determinants of knowledge, this aspect is deleted for the
purpose of emphasizing the part of the sociolooy of knowledge
which has been largely ignored. A structural linguistic analysis
of current theory would be prohibitively long; besides, the
technique has not been developed to any point of precision. The
dialectical nature of the flux of thought, theory, and society
and culture is only assumed here as we are dealing with only one
part of the sociology of knowledge. With these limitations, the
thesis proceed*.
-••••••
1 56Wil1iam James, Principles of Psychology, I (New York:
Dover Publications, 1908), pp. 291-3017
CHAPTER IV
A MODEL OF MODAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AND EMERGENT THEORY
In this conceptual model no reference is made to empirical
content. The pattern of the relationships among the concepts are
simply described and defined. It is hoped that the model will
provide a meaningful context within which specific findings can
later be located. The model is generally construed to be an
exploratory, heuristic symbolic construction ccnteiningve
testable statements. The statements are not expressed in any
axiomatic or propositional form; it is only a model in tl-ie most
general sense of the term. There is no attempt made to measure
the statements in quantitative terms. The model simply seeks to
reduce the complexity of the phenomena under study into a more
parsimonious framework.
The basic premise of this model, then, is that there are
certain modal forms of consciousness from which one can expect
different kinds of social theories to emerge. "Social theory" it
used rather than sociological theory; the latter refers more to
strict propositional systems, few of which exist in sociology.
such of the work gone in sociological theory has been in actuality




it is suggested that a precise sociological theory could be
predicated from each corresponding social theey. This first
premise is not without precedent. Kienzle says:
Ontological and epistemolooical ideas are embedded in
the sociologists' thinking about man and his relation
to other men, and these ideas help the sociologist
shape his defiQWons of social phenomena and the areas
he will study.lw
Working on similar assumptions, Martindale abstractly charted the
major types of theories in terms of their combination of
ontological and epistemological components. The primary ontology,
or theory of reality, was divided into sociological holism and
elementarism. Its major epistemology, or theory of method,
divided as positivism and anti-positivism.158 Neither of these
two studies took consciousness itself as a variale.
The next premise is that these modal forms of consciousness
can be structured into corresponding systems of knowledge, or
systems of relevance as described by Alfred Schutz. However, we
go further than this by relying on an excellent theoretical work
by Judith Willer. She defined systems of knowledge as being:
. . . nothing more than a set of ideas about the nature
of the world and the relationships in it. Systems ef
knowledge are collections of explanations of the
relatedness of A and B (or C and D, etc.) which have
been needed to explain or predict B or to determine
what to do to get from circumstance A to B. Individuai
157Kienz1e, "Epistemology and Sociology," p. 411.
158  Don Vartindale, "Lir,its and Alternatives to Functionalism
in Socelocv," in Martindale, Functionalisr in V.te Sccial Sciences
(Philadelphia: .rierican Academy of i-olitical and Social Science,
1965), pp. 144-163.
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explanation of events will differ according to the
different systems of kno4ledge.159
It must be emphasized that the svstems of knowledge descriLrA are
ideal constructs; in actuality any set of ideas will only approximate
this construct as a matter of degree.
Finally, "methodological orientation" is broadly defined
as a predisposition to describe, explain, and justify the subject
matter under study on the basis of general philosophiu.1 principles.
This is distinct from the actual methods or techniques used, and,
is very similar to the word epistemology as Martindale uses it.
The model, sketched on the following page, makes no attmpt
to connect the constellations of thought patterns in their
dialectical relationship to social structures or culture patterns;
presupposing as this does the development of an adequate
methodology.
"Modal consciousness" has been defined in Chapter III. The
four forms described are not meant to be exhaustive of all
possibilities; the most conspicuous exclusion here has been of
irrational thought patterns, although nonrational patterns have
been included.
160
It is recognized that there are alternative
terms to describe these properties. However, the author believes
that the terms used adequately symbolize the appropriate properties.
159Judith Willer, The Social Deterrrination of Knowledge
(Inglewood-Cliffs: Prentice-Hell, p. it.
ft
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See Herbert M. Garelick, Modes of Irrationality, 

















































































































































































































The next step is definition of these four forms of modal
consciousness:
DIALECTICAL: The mind interprets phenomena and events in
their continuously chancing aspects which
are fully understood when the funda-nental
concepts correspond to the trichotomous
character of the process of thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis. The mind is able to understand
the universe, and events are seer to te
determined by the operation of antEgonistic
forces and contradictions. Reality is
conceived in its totality, in its various
dimensions, expressions, end manifestations.161
As Gurvitch says, "Th.2 dialectic focuses cn
the complexities, sinuosities, flexibilities
and constantly renewing tensions, along with
the unexpected turn of events of social
reality—all of these must be taken into 
162account to comprehend . . . social entities.
ANALYTICAL: The analytic form of consciousness breaks
eleents of reality down into its parts and
seeks to find interrelations amnno tnem. It
focnes on a scleccd aspect abstracted from
complex, multidimensional nhenomena.
SYNTHETIC: Syntic consciousness is the opposite of
analytic, focusing on the whole as sc7ething
greater than its parts; complex phenomena are
grasped in their totality. it is crganismic,
nomothetic, and proceeds from the general to
the particular; i.e., it is deductive rather
than inductive.
PHENOMENOLOGICAL: The phenomenolocical form of consciousness
interprets the world in terms of reflective
subj%.ctive processes, attempting to arrive at
the pure essence or eidos of experience: wir
wollen auf die 'Sachen seltst' zuruckcehen
(we will co back to seeing things in
themselves).
161See Adler, "A Quantitative Study in the Sociolngy ofKnowledge," p. 43.
162Quoted in Philip Bosserman, Dialectical Sociolocv.i AnAnalysis of the Sociolcly of Georqe Gurvitch Oostcn: PorterSarcent, 1960-7 p. 22J.
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Dialectical consciousness is considered last as we have
defined science as emerging out of this particular mode of.
consciousness, which is probably objectionable to most social
"scientists" today. To avoid confusion by analytically treEking
down the model into each constituitive part, the knowledge systems,
methodological orientations, erd social theories of each mode of
consciousness are considered each in turn as a cluster.
The analytic mind, breakino reality into its parts and
isolated elements, is structured into a magical system of knowledge
concomitant with an empirical methodology; in microsociological
work a large part of research is nothing more than a mathematical
conglomerate of statistinal analysis. Olen writino of a !nagical
system of knowledoe, the author relies on the work of Judith
Willer:
Knowledge in a magical system consists of knm.'ing how
connections between condition A and cordition B, the
cause of the change from one condition to another. F(Nr
ony individual, knOledge of causal connection is needed
to determine action in pursuit of specific ends. The
test of this type of knowledge is strongly dependent OA
trial and error. . . . Magical systems utilize trial
and error methods because there is no choice; all tests
ot kno4ledoe must rely on em2irical evidence, the only
type of evidence possi4166104
By empirical is meant the classic definition of gaining knowledge
through observation relying on the senses. Empirical connections
are usually made by associating A and B over time; in sociology
these are usually expressed by using statistical correlations.
This cnisternnlooicl or metholological orientation is cheractcristIC
163Wil1cr, The Social Dete”minetion of KnoOece, p.
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of magical knowledge system:;; although it has to be emphasized
that while magical knowledge is empirical, not all empiricism is
magical. Empirical thinking is part of the thinking in any system
of knovledge made up of sensing individuals. Empiricism is only
magical if it alone forms the basis for gaining knowledge about
the world.
Pitirim A. Sorokin has made perhaps the most scathing,
critical analysis of the use of statistical and mathematical data
in the social sciences, commenting on what he calls the "cult of
numerology" and "quantrephrenia .164 . Increasingly it seems that
social "scientists" use cor.puters and statistical analysis to
"prove" relationships between empirical phenomena on a trial and
error basis. The century-old insight of David Hume that
correlation is net causation is passed over by our modern magioians
in their quest to find strict causal relationships between isolated
empirical occurrences. Hubert Blalock himself recognizes the
limitations of this mode of thinking:
Causal laws, then, are assumed by the scientist. When they
appear to be violated, he reformulates them so as to account
for existing facts . . . Bertrand Russell notes that causal
laws are really only applicable to a completely isolated
system. . . . Since it will always be possible that s.orne
unknown forces ray be operating to disturb a given causal
relationship, or to lead us to believe a causal relationship
exists when in fact it does not, the only way we can make
causal inferences at all is to maiie simplifying assumptTens
about such disturbing influences.lt6
164 • ti •Plr v,i A. Sorokin, Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociolooy
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 19-5TT, pp. 102-173.
165.
Hubert i:,ialcok, Causal Infererces in NorExperimentel




Yet despite this skepticism modern statistician-magicians have
become ever more esoteric, constantly inventing new techniques
without questoning their basic assumptions. For example, path
analysis, fcr all its complexity, boils down to a criss-crossing
of lines and arrry;:s with statistical correlations printed beside
them. The cultish nature of these practices are evident in the
controversy over the "sacredness of .05" in significance tests.1E5
Sorokin says of this analytical-empirical constellation that:
As a result of the unwarranted extension of the knowledee
of "specks" supplied by analytic and fact-finding theories,
and of the neacerness and uncertainty of such knowledge,
the recent predominantly analytical and fact-finding
theories have increased our knowledge of the total socio-
cultural reality only slightly, especially in the field of
multidimensional macrosociological systems of "civili-
zations," cultural supersystems, and great historcal
social systems. In some cases they have even yielded more
pseudoscientific ,,ham-truth, half-truth, and plain error
than valid truth. 67
Malinowski noted that magic is surrounded by certain strict
conditions: exact remembrance cf a spell, unimpeachable performance
of the rites, and unswerving adhesion to the taboos which shaekle
the magician. As he says, "if any one of these is neglect&d,
failure of magic occurs." 
168
In graduate schools new initiates
are socialized into accepting statistical formulas as part of their
166James K. Skipper, et al., "The Sacredness of .05: A
Note Concerning the Use of Statistical Levels of Significance..
American Sociologist, 2 (February, 1967), pp. 16-144
16 •7Pitirim Sorokin, "Sociology of Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow," American Sociological Review, 30 (Deceeber,
831.
lfift.„--pronisiaw Malinowski, Macic, Science and RelicTen
(New York: Anchor Books, 1954), p. 85.
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professional life, serving to insure the cultish nature of mcdernacademia. A statement is not true if it has logical coherence,but only when supported by some numerical data. Modern sociologycould do well to look back to the freements of Philolaus for averbal rite of passage:
In truth, everything that can be known has a Nurber;for it is impossible to grasp anything with the mindor to recognize it without it.
Number has two distinct forms, odd and even, and athird compounded of both, the even-odd; each of thesetwo forms has many aspects, which each separate objectdemonstrates in itself.
The first composite entity, the One, which is the centerof the Sphere, is called Hearth.169
Facetious as this may sound, medical students still quote theHippocratic Oath and the fragments of Philolaus reflect the
dominant orientation in sociology in its ancient way.
It is not the purpose here at all to reject outright theuse of analytical-empirical mathematical analysis, which are integralparts of research and of science, but only of the latter if handledin conjunction with the other parts of the scientific orientationwhich we shall describe. As for now, the author agrees with JudithWiller who says, "the prevailing system of knowle0e in the modernworld, the system of knowledge which typically dictates thedevelopment and use of science, is a modern form of masic."17g
169Quoted by Gicroio de Santillana, The Orioins of
Scientific Thez:cht (New York: Ventor Books, .1i), p. 67-68.17 °Willer, The Social Determination of Knte:ledce, p. 134.
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Synthetic consciousness, on the contrary, is structured
into a religious knowledge system. The methodological orientation
is that of a holistic-rationalism; from this constellation cf
thought may emer2e social theory in the form of Kultorso2iologie.
In its own way it is just as one-sided as the analytical-magical-
empirical-mathematical cluster. Alfred North Whitehead describes
religion as follows:
Religion is the translation of general ideas into
particular thougHtE, ;articular e72tions, and parti-
cular purposes; it is directed to the end of stretching
individual interest beyond its self-defeatino parti-
cularity. . . . Religion is centered upon the harrony
of rational thought sensitive reaction to the percepta
from which the experience oriainates . . . [thus]
religion &els with the formation of the experiencing
subject.171
In Judith Willer's model or framework knowledoe in a religious
system consists of rational connections between concepts and -
concepts.177 In addition to rationalism, the epistemolocical or
methodological orientation emanating from a religious knowledge
system is holistic; th4 view that basic social reality c.)nsists of
interrelated wholes which are superior to the individual and his
acts. In logical thought processes this would make L. ligiouc-
rationalistic constellation most amenable tc deductive and
nomothetic methods of reasoning. Thus, if the first group were
the magicians of sociology, this group would by analogy be the
priests. The problem classically with this group is that their
171  Alfred North Whitehead, Process and keali*.y CleW YoOk:
Free Press, 1929), pp. 1S-20.
172
Willer, The Social Determination of Knowleclat, p. 29.
'
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construction of grand rational theories has rarely if ever been
combined with empirical verification, although Sorokin came close
in his Social and Cultural pynamics. Thus.the defects in the
analytical-magical-empirical-mathematical constellation are the
virtues of the synthetic-religious-rationalistic-Kultursoziolegie
complex, and vice versa. As the latter are working on such a
grand scale, they are more likely to look at cultural and historical
supersysters or civilizations. As sociology is fairly well-
dominated by the former, the need to criticize Kultursoziolodie is
not as imperative.
Phenomenological consciousness is manifest in a mystical
system of knowledge, an experential methodological orientation,
and Verstehen type social theories. In mystical systems an
attempt is made to escape the empirical world, ironically by
emphasizing irrediate experience or awareness and direct, intimate
consciousness of a divine presence. Since the method of orientation
is experential, it is criticized tor not being verifiable and often
connotes spurious knowledge. Actually, if empiricism is defined
as knowledge obtained through the senses, experential methods of
gathering knowledge would be empiricism oar execellence.173 How-
ever, the distinction is one of validity; how can subjective
experience be actually verified? "Experential" by definition is
the condition or state of subjectivity or awareness, and in the
mystical system of knowledge v,ould be the Oasis of what the Germans
172See Peter A. Munch, "Erpirical Science and Max WEber'sYerstehende Soziolocie," American Scciolo:Jcal Review. 22(Februery, 1S:3-1), pp. 25-'7?.
ICO
call tinticismus; while the word Mystik would be reserved for the
higher form of experience which involves a divine presence. The
phenomenological mode of consciousness does not contradict any of
the other three; as do the analytic and synthetic modes; rather
It comprehends and filters through them in a unique, penetrating
way:
Our knowledge in life is not without hypotheses,
inductions, and predictions, but they all have the
character of the approximate and th2 typical. The
ideal of everyday knowledge is not certainty nor even
probability in a mathematical sense, but just likeli-
hood. Anticipations of future states of affairs are
conjectures about what is to be hoped or feared, or
at best, about what can be reasonably expected. ',:hea
afterwards the anticipated state of affairs tel:es sore
form in actuality, we do not say that our prediction
has cu:ie true or is proved false, cr that our hepos or
fears were or were not well founded. The consistency
of this system of knowledge is not that of natural
laws, but that of ical sequences and relaticns.174
The last cluster which must be defined is the dialectical-
scientific-abstractive-levels of explanation constellation,
Contemporary sociology 'has tended to define science only in terms
of its methods and not in its more general philosophical sensa.
The dialectic, by definition, brir:s he analytic and synthettc
forms of consciousness together, and in so doing is able to View
social reality in its complexities and at its different levele.
The alstract4—_ methodological orientation is talen as deflnee by
Judith Willer as connecting the theoretic I:rationalistic, and
observational (unpiricall levels. She conttnuew
't may ber'in at the observationl level end conclude
at the theoretical level or vice versa. Observablft
174




are always connected to nonobservables in abstraction,
empirical terms to rational concepts . . . Empirical
thouoht uses only observables, rational thought uses
only mental concepts, and abstraction uses only rental
concepts and observables together.175
NO4 it is clear why, at the end of Chapter II, the efforts of
various thinkers in the sociology of kno4ledge to synthesize
empiricism and rationalism were given such a prominent place in
the review of literature. Several of the men who were doing so
were striving to conceptualize a true science which avoids the
dilemmas presented above. Karl Marx was perhaps the most
successful in his depiction of such a method for social science;
his empirical-dialectical methodology is what Willer terms
"abstractive." Baali and Price suggest that:
. . . the dialectic of Marx can be shown to be an
historical generalization which evolves from empirical
observations. This generalization, embedded as it is
in empirical reality, can be abstracted from its co:Aext
and be posited as a methodology in itself; thus we may
speak of an empirical -dialectical mathodolocy. Because
of the dialectic's rationalistic character, with an
empirical-dialectical methodolocy we have a synthesis
of percept and concept, the key to a unity of theory
and method in sociology.1/O
Thus only thinking which combines synthetic, analytic and
phenomenological forms of consciousness and the systems of knowledge
and methodological orientations is considered here to be scientific.
If thinking were only in the synthetic cluster, it would be
essentially religious. If, on the other hand, it remains only at
the analytic level, it is magical. Similarily, phenomenolugica4
175 iller, The Sojal D,trmination of Kna,:leCe. p. 24.
176Baali and Price, "The Erpirical-Dialectical Pethodology
of Ibn Khaldun and Karl ilerx," pp. 1-2.
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thought alone results in mysticism. The three thought modes
(analytic, synthetic, phenomenological) combine, respectively,
empirical description, theoretical generalization, and understandine;
and ties them in with a holism which seeks to explain the total
social-cultural reality. This is science defined on a far broader
level than its traditional, methods-oriented description.
The sociologist who comes closest to this is perhaps George
Gurvitch. A synopsis of his work is available by Philip Bosserman
and by Piti rim A. Sorokin, along with their perceptive critiques
of his theoretical system.
177
In his sociology of total social
phenomena Gurvitch describes the vertical and horizontal view of
social reality combined with explanations about various depth
levels. His methodolooy is dialectical, and at the same time
exudes a quest for understanding in the phenomenological stran of
thought. Gurvitch has developed a microsociology, a macrosociology,
and an analysis of global structures. In his Dialectique et
Sociologie he acknowledces that social scientists have little
alternative often to causal analysis in ordering social data, but
he does not resort to magic in doing so. Unfortunately, this is
also the weakest point in his work, for there is little if aw
empirical verification, violating one of the basic premises of
scientific thought. The author believes that the sciemtiftC
thought style described will help solve the need for a
17?Dosserman, Dialectical Socioloov; Pitirim A. Sorokitt,
Sociolocical Theories -a- Tooa'71New York: Harper and Row, 1960,
P?. 462-526.
*4164440.10**411111KW - '4 t
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metatheoretical framewcrk in sociology; Llewllyn Gross himself
adopts a "neodialectical framew3rk."178
As language and linguistics have been a central part of
the definition of the sociology of knowledge in this thesis, it
woud help expedite matters if, in looking at sociology of
knowledge and sociological theory, there were a body of
metalinguistic principles or methodology for defining real:,ty and
justifying claims of scientific adequacy. As Gross says,
"sociological theory, whatever else it ray be, is made known
through one or more language schemes. . . . One kind of language
is taken as standard-bearer, and all others are evaluated by
it."179
In this chapter we have briefly outlined how the sociology
of knowledge can be useful to sociological theory; in thic instance
by helping to describe to what extent sociology is scientific.
If, as we have suggested, there is very little in sociology that
can be called scientific, what are the reasons? Here is where
the more traditional aspect of the sociology of knowledge comes
into prominence by analyzing social and cultural conditions which
are created by and creating the specific modal forms of
consciousness from which these scientific, magical, and mystical
178L. Gross, "Preface to a Metatheoretical Framework for
Sociology." American Journal of Sociology, 67 (September, 196i),
pp. 125-136.
179L. Gross, "An Epistemological View cf Sociolcrical
Theory,' Arerican Journal of Sociolo:y, (5 (1960), pp. 441-448.
knowledge systems emerge. Why, in particular, is the dilectical
mode of consciousness not prevalent in American culture?
By not defining the sociology cf knowledge in terms of
ideology, it has been possible to avoid the muckraking polemical
approach of a Gouldner to the problems inherent in the construction
of sociological theory. Similarily, the epistemological relativism
which leads to an intellectual disarray has been avoided.
. In the final chapter, the thesis will be briefly summed
and any additional conclusions or suggestions appended.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis began with two purposes in mind: (1) to offer
a more adequate definition of the sociology of knowledge; and
(2) apply this definition in its relationship to sociological
theory.
In response to the first goal, previously existing
theoretical approaches to the sociology of knowledge were exarined,
noting their similarities and differences. The structural and
cultural approaches were presented as the two opposing tradiVonal
conceptualizations of the subject matter of the sociolczy of
knowledge; whereas greater length was given to the most neglected
branch; that of the phenomenologists, which was shoYn not to be
incompatible with logical empiricism. The struggle to separate
the sociology of science from the sociology of knowledge was
analyzed; and the sociology of sociology was placed in a context
as to its classification. Finally, existing conterponarY
empirical studies in the sociology of knowledge were reviewed.
Chapter II ended with a detail summary of some basic conceptual
components and common themes in the sociology of knovledoe.
Chapter III, building on the conclusions of the review of
litirature, isolated so-r? theoretical issues and problem involved
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in defining the sociology of knowledge: these centered on the
role of thc dialectic and on language. At that point, the
sociology of knowledge was distinguished from other disciplines
such as epistemology and political sociology. The discipline was
also distinguished from sociological theory, recognizing that a
sociological theory of knowledge was possible. The "passivist"
orientation inherent in traditional sociology of knowledge was
contrasted to the "activist" classical theory of knowledge,
along with the ensuing problems of objectivity, relativism, and
imputation. Sug2estions were made of the possible bearing the
sociology of knowledge might have on sociological theory. At
this point a definition of the sociolocy of knowleege was
offered, which led to an emphasis on the role of consciousnes5,
Chapter IV constructed an exploratory model to make the
connection ;Detween the sociology of knowledge and theoretical
frameworks in sociolon; that is, a model of modal consciousness
and emeroent theory. The model provided a standard against
which the scientific quality of sociolooy might be evaluated.
George Gurvitch was believed to most completely fulfill the
model's definition of science in sociolov.
The author believes, then, that the twofold task which
was set for the thesis wLs accomplished as to its definition of
the sociology of knowledge, and that the exploratcry modo4
represents a partial contribution to the better urderstanding of
the cognitive framework from which theory emerges.
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Althoug:i models are somewhat untestable, the possibility
for precise empirical research within this theoretical frarrework
is by no means precluded. The definition of science in this
thesis was broad; and because of the lack of empirical data in
the thesis, by the author's own terms it would seem to border on
the religious system of knwledge. The study was carried in a
dialectical frame of reference, though, attempting to synthesize
contradicting approaches in a complex field. In actuality, the
study is meta-scientific.
In very general terms the author has tried to avoid the
situation described so effectively by Gunter Remmlin2:
The emergence of separate thouoht-styles with their
corresponding universes of discourse has two conse-
quences: each of these universes develops a parnoie'al
response to all the otners, since its exponents
experience the existence of conflicting interpretations
and views as a threat to the truth and rightness of
their own universe of discourse. Second, the process
of meaningful communication between these mutually
distrustful universes comes to a virtual standstill.
Eventually all objective and factually grounded inquiry
into the content of out-group utterances is replaced by
the suspicious query: What are the ulterior motives
behind the outside point of view?160
A dialectical, phenomenological understanding of social reality
seeks to reconcile these conflicting systems of relevances into
a ground of common meaning, scientific understanding. However1
this is but a matter of choice, as the ultimate truth value of
each constellaticn described can only be relative.
18°Remmling, The Road to Suspicion, p. 7.
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